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Abstract
This dissertation advances a theory of affective rhetoricity through personal
narrative and an integrative literature review as a methodological approach. The project
draws on a theoretical framework constructed from intra- and extra-disciplinary
theories of posthumanism, affect, language, material feminism, object-oriented
ontology, new materialism, and rhetoric through which collisions between objects and
language are examined as arguments for affective rhetoricity as a revised way of
understanding rhetoric’s force. The study culminates with ethical and pedagogical
implications for the rhetoric and writing classroom, what it means to enact an
ontological disposition toward writing, and an exploration of our human capacity to
write more meaningfully.
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Chapter 1: Decentering Language
In the fall of 2018, I sat in the university writing center at my institution and
eagerly listened to Anne von Petersdorff, Ph.D., a scholar in German Studies and Digital
Humanities, detail the documentary that became her dissertation. Her
autoethnographic work enviably took her across several different countries as she
experienced unfamiliar cultures and living conditions, showcasing female
intersubjectivity and embodiment produced through the lens of the camera. von
Petersdorff (2018) advocates “experiencing the fringes” in scholarly work and argues for
a cross-disciplinarity that draws strongly on one’s positionality and the incorporation of
hybridity, as evidenced by her project. She further discussed the importance of making
and keeping one’s scholarly work personal through focusing on one’s original
contribution to knowledge; in effect, for von Petersdorff this is central to how knowledge
is created. My own concept of knowledge is defined by the observation and processing of
linguistic, material collaborations and contributions between and among human and
nonhuman bodies in the environment. Knowledge is therefore always becoming,
unfolding, and defined by impermanence. What has stayed with me most, though, is the
idea that one’s writing is defined to a great extent by one’s material, temporal, and
relational limits. While I admire scholars who have the freedom and resources to globetrek for the purposes of academic travel and research projects, I have no choice but to
acknowledge the extent of my personal limitations and my historic reliance on language
which has both shaped my personal and academic life and has afforded me a scholastic
perspective that has both challenged and hindered me. My claim and early theoretical
work in the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies is a culmination of how I have
understood the tangled relationship between the world, myself, and all others. It is an
1

exercise in exploring the relationships between the material and feelings; in effect, how
“what’s lying around in the environment” (Rickert, 2004) produces affect and makes
space for rhetoric—without language. I am intrigued by the concept of the posthuman
which has enabled me to begin to that enable me to move beyond language as my
primary vehicle for knowledge and understanding. I am especially concerned with the
inability of the human to trust intuition, to let go of the structuring capability of
language to construct one’s mind.
Wanting Words
From a very young age, I have been enchanted by words and, consequently,
expected a great deal from them. Like many others, I have been captivated by the idea
that language, and my ability to use it correctly and stylistically, serves as the primary
vehicle to academic success, and from there, all other successes in life. In an early
childhood development center at the university where my father worked, I used Mr.
Sketch markers to carefully scribe words I already knew how to spell on stiff, bookmarkshaped cardstock bound with a metal ring. I added to the ring and reviewed—what I
already knew—over and over until I felt I had mastered those words. A few years later, I
was gifted the 1962 edition of the World Book and read voraciously, often staying up
past bedtime to satisfy my desire to know through words. My family recognized this
about me and furnished me with novels that were generally outside of my interest and
attention span (later I was always given blank journals—all of which have remained
mostly blank—because it was presumed that I liked writing in my free time because I
enjoyed reading so much). They assumed that because I was a proficient reader that I
understood all that I read or that I enjoyed encountering words I didn’t know. I
preferred to stick with that which was familiar: I read and reread young adult fiction
2

that resonated with me. Nothing challenging. I felt I could read well but was not always
able to comprehend. I realize now that saying that I can read is incongruent with saying
I can read that which troubles or challenges me or my dominant position over words
that I knew. The words I love and were familiar with never changed, the stories never
changed, and my feelings about them never changed. Reading the same books over and
over provided a stability like no other; I also see now that I have always been searching
for solid ground on which to stand, on which to base my life. Now, I understand that the
desire for stability in an uncertain world is simply one part of what it means to be
human. Now, I realize that there exists an inarticulable, affective element that not only
diminishes language and rhetoric as singlehandedly responsible for all that humans
know but underscores all human and nonhuman interaction as a priori.
My claim in the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies and the undergirding of
this dissertation is fundamentally informed by a longstanding desire to question what
we value and teach in rhetoric and writing courses and how we go about teaching those
shifting, temporal values that are seemingly impossible to find, to pin down once and for
all (Vitanza, 2003). In carefully considering Vitanza’s assertion that writing simply
wants—not what humans want writing to do, not what humans want from writing, and
not what humans gain from writing—we are forced to interrogate our relationship with
writing and the institutions that govern writing pedagogy as one that is focused
primarily on a product marked by stability and correctness. As such, a posthuman
writing disposition is guided by the notion that writing cannot produce exactly what
humans want because it, as a practice, is granted ontological equity with humans and all
other bodies, human and nonhuman. Posthumanism is simply not about what humans
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want from any other body, but ethically requires us to ask what is wanted by human and
nonhuman others. I examine ethical writing instruction responsibilities in chapter 4.
Ecological Complexities
My interest in theories of the posthuman, therefore, is driven by a preoccupation
with the notion that humans do not preside in positions over all other forms of matter
including writing and its deliverables, which implicates us to acknowledge the “muddy,
messy conditions of our existence” (Coole and Frost, 2010) with regard to the ecological,
environmental, political, and technological—material—entanglements we find ourselves
in. In other words, the world and our positions in it have been made theoretically
foreign under posthumanism, as humans have historically ascertained our unyielding
power over things, people, and events we believed we had control over. It is this human
acknowledgement and consequent relinquishing of power that compels me to
rearticulate for myself and for those I teach and learn with how this ontologically
complex disposition toward existence changes how we and our students write with,
around, about, in response to, and in the world, especially in light of the complexities in
responding to, for example, the gravity of human and nonhuman ecological concerns
regarding climate change, polarizing human ideologies and realities driven by political
rhetoric and discourse and defined by an uninhibited persuasion in which nothing is off
limits, and biological threats that we cannot foresee—all examples of the invisibility that
characterizes the affectual complexities and constant becoming of material and bodily
interactions, human and nonhuman.
Intra-Disciplinary Conflict
A recent, ongoing debate among contemporary rhetoric and writing studies
scholars involving feminist assertions of rhetoric’s materiality and proponents of object4

oriented ontology has illuminated the juncture in rhetorical studies that prompts my
disciplinary claim and research. Historically, feminism has been concerned with
accounting for power imbalances between bodies, a “volatile” undertaking that has
relegated the feminisms to “taking refuge within culture, discourse, and language;”
however, Alaimo and Hekman (2008) suggest that “feminist theory is at an impasse
caused by the contemporary linguistic turn in feminist thought” (p. 1). Dismantling
power imbalance(s) between bodies has been, historically, the central focus of feminism.
While language, defined here as a strictly human, material expression that reveals an
intrinsic human need for communication, has wielded its power in favor of producing
feminist theory and laid the foundation necessary for making known the “pernicious
logic that casts woman as subordinated, inferior, a mirror of the same, or all but
invisible,” it has detracted attention from the body’s ecological materiality which reveals
a corporeal reality more than one painted by words and discourse about the body
(Alaimo & Hekman, 2008, p. 2). Material feminism is interested in exploring agential
relationality with all forms of matter, human and nonhuman, and how matter acts both
alongside, because of, and independently of language and discourse. Recognition of the
material conditions of my own life compel me to acknowledge that my social identity is
shaped by my body and language surrounding it, as well as its role in how my own
reality has been shaped through my body’s material relationships. In exploring the
concept of the posthuman and the externality that it depends on as a theoretical
concept, the body as relevant to feminism is a central facet to the concept of the
posthuman.
I am similarly and, perhaps, contradictorily, drawn to object-oriented ontology, a
set of theories ostensibly supported by white men in the discipline of rhetoric and
5

writing studies. It seems to account more effectively for the rhetoricity of matter—that
is, how matter is agential—and is not focused solely on human relationality with other
forms of matter. The openness and “flat ontography” (Zabrowski, 2016) supplied by
object-oriented ontology attends specifically to the delegitimizing of human
exceptionalism so that all forms of matter can be granted equal rhetoricity, and
therefore, agency. Based on this premise, it could be said that object-oriented ontology
acts as a form of whiteness, reinforcing and enacting a kind of sameness as difference
model for examining the rhetoricity and relationships of bodies, both human and
nonhuman. By displacing the human as central to knowing and deprivileging human
thought as superior to other forms of logic, object-oriented ontology has the grave
potential to remove the lived, material experiences of people as simply being part of a
network of matter, potentially stripping people of identity as constructed through
human social interaction. Human social construction, including all forms of
communication, both material and immaterial, is responsible for maintaining humanity
as the ultimate position to such a degree that we have used words to simultaneously
dehumanize and exoticize the Other to preserve perceived power and positions as
supreme above all else (Said, 1978). To erase language or diminish its ultra-significant
role from human experience would be to erase what it means to be human; however, by
placing language as material on the same plain as all other forms of matter, it’s possible
to acknowledge language as having no greater agency than any other material, human or
nonhuman.
Rhetoric’s Materiality: A Clash
Recent scholarly movements in the discipline illuminate the “significant
challenge” rhetoric faces in, at the very least, incorporating objects into the sphere of
6

what counts as rhetorical, recognizing “the way things are and the rhetorical force they
wield in relation to us and other things” (Barnett & Boyle, 2015, p.2). The cumulative
relational, interactional nature of all things, materials, and bodies produces affect
characterized by a flood of material interactions both human and nonhuman which
produces a form of opaque knowing—very much like a photograph featuring a subject
and a backdrop that made the photograph possible. It’s true that the backdrop isn’t
necessarily always considered, rather, it is the occasion that is remembered because of
the backdrop. A rhetorical, affectual energy is drawn from the presence and composition
of the existing arrangement of materials, bodies, and objects. Thus, my scholarship
interests are rooted firmly in the affective rhetorical spaces that exist between humans
and nonhumans. My positionality guides and complicates my research and writing in
such a way that I must acknowledge how my theoretical disposition both informs and
muddles my thinking and is responsible for that which I have been socially groomed to
uphold as a white woman. Because of my attentiveness and orientation to language and
words, while also being keenly aware of how I am affected by the things in my
environment—photographs of my grandparents resting on the desk my father built me
as I write, an abstract statue of a ballerina embodying the memory of an art I have loved
and practiced, a grammar textbook published in 1913 that I inherited from my
grandmother—that I am interested in how we know what we know in the absence of
language.
The discipline of rhetoric and writing studies has provided the space for me to
explore the clash between language and material. Human language cannot exist
independently of the material, objects, and all bodies, making the human completely
dependent on what exists, what we’ve created and reciprocally benefited from. My
7

scholarly research of the posthuman, affect theory, and the convergences with rhetoric
as energy have compelled me to not only recognize, but fully acknowledge the openness
required in this inquiry toward a challenging, but necessary acknowledgement of new
materialist work to ignore identity-based bodies—bodies that have undeniably and often
painfully shaped by what we have typically thought of as the social. In other words, it is
inherently unethical to ignore that which has constructed our human bodies and have,
indeed, played a role in our individual and collective experience and exposure to objects
that exist both because of and in spite of humans. Perhaps the human body, in its
externalized complexity, is the most helpful metaphor for how to approach writing
studies through the various lenses and angles of new materialism. While it is necessary
to acknowledge that the human is not the locus of knowledge and meaning making
through its most valuable, yet egregious, gift—language—it has clouded our collective
view of ourselves, who we are, how we relate (or not) to some bodies and not others.
Decentering language as the primary source of human interaction and relatedness
compels us to find different ways of relating; it forces us to consider the entirety of the
human as not only socially constructed but possessing the capacity to affect and be
affected in ways that often invisible.
Clary-Lemon (2019) argues for a thorough review of the whole of scholarship
involving new materialist approaches in rhetoric and writing studies beyond the “cast of
characters” currently circulating in the research strands of the posthuman, affect
studies, new materialism, and object-oriented ontology. She recommends that scholars
place Indigenous knowledge and scholars at the front of these studies in an effort to
ethically resituate this thinking away from “primarily Western philosophical worldviews
to the complete ignorance (often best case) and willful negation (worst case) of the work
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of Indigenous thinkers and writers” (Clary-Lemon, 2019). These strands of thought have
typically not given enough attention to the social construction of human bodies and the
very real implications of those constructions in everyday life. Even Latour suggests that
these concerns are best left to the sociologists, reinforcing the notion that the human
body and its very real experiences can be flattened to the level of all other objects,
materials, and their interactions (Clary-Lemon, 2019). This dissertation, as evidence of
my novice theoretical work in these complex areas, invites me to examine yet another
strand of research that seeks to make sense of racial disparities—beyond that which
social construction will have us consider.
My claim in the discipline of writing studies, thus, is a convergence of my
proclivity for language and the nagging feeling that while language has been definitive of
social construction and has created an academic space for me, fails to account for the
seemingly neutral, invisible, but affective, and therefore agential, spaces between all
bodies and forms of matter, human and nonhuman. As a result, my disciplinary pursuits
are firmly rooted in a paradoxical, persistent wrestling with my intrinsic need for
intellectual and epistemological stability in a world that I have found in language, in
conjunction with the realization that language is inherently inadequate to account for all
forms of knowing—a realization that, for me, demands greater attunement to that which
we owe our humanity or that which we have long defined as human. While this
understanding feels like an original discovery for me, and certainly, my scholarly work is
deeply informed by my own experiences and observations about language and the role it
has played in shaping my thinking about the theory and practice of writing and rhetoric,
it is not new to the discipline (Worsham, 2014; Hawhee, 2016; Rickert, 2014). A
disciplinary focus in rhetoric and writing studies has provided me with the language I
9

have felt I have needed to fully articulate my observations, which stands in clear
dissonance to my need to simultaneously acknowledge affect as a necessary rhetorical
partner without cementing language as the final word, the sole creator of knowledge, the
foundation from which all is built. I have claimed the discipline through sheer
uncertainty and trepidation of words, and yet, have found an absolute necessity to
harness my theoretical observations through language I have had to learn through
scholarly research and putting my own views in conversation with those who have
shaped our historic understanding of rhetoric and its role in shaping reality.
Resistance to Language as Truth
I am contradictorily reliant on and resistant to language as a primary way to
understand the material—human and nonhuman—interactions that construct our lives
and existence, and this contradiction lies at the center of my claiming the discipline of
writing studies. As a result, I have approached the discipline as an exercise in exploring
the relationships between language, material, and affect. From the time I was a young
white student in a historically black elementary school, newly integrated, to the year I
began graduate studies in technical communication, I have observed intently the
complexities of how the environment shapes and is shaped by human and object
interaction: the aged school building in the thick, humid woods, the long evenings
writing and fumbling with new online technologies to do graduate work. Barad (2003)
suggests that an overreliance on language has ultimately deterred us from considering
material interactions not only as fundamental to life, but primary in how those
interactions produce affect—ultimately guiding our actions and thoughts in such a way
that creates the need and desire for language. Language enables naming how and what
we think, know, and feel; however, an epistemic dependency on language enables a
10

creative construction that is often not representative of the “truth” of material
interactions (Martin, 1991) and takes on what we traditionally consider rhetoric—a
version of the truth made possible and enhanced by language. This is especially evident
in recent political media in which the public has become more acquainted with concepts
that have become of interest to the public through political discourse like alternative
facts and gaslighting. Language has been central to human knowledge-making, and the
ability to read and write manifests in our everyday with every social media post, every
impromptu scroll of the news feed, every text. While digital media use and technological
advancements have made possible our need and perception of connection, the
invisibility of those connections makes their origins opaque, at best. This view of digital
and social media mirrors the theoretical assertions I make throughout this dissertation
in that we are unable to grasp the interactional, often invisible, forces that create what
we see in our screens. Our screens offer a looking-glass view of what we write (both
literally and metaphorically) is inevitably returned to us through our digital
participation; yet, the virality of rhetorical production through media is evidence that we
are unable to detect the origins of posts, texts, ideas that are circulating based on an
unfolding of events characterized by a collaboration among, between, because of, and in
spite of an infinite collective of human and nonhuman actors.
Rhetoric’s Potential
In beginning coursework and tutoring students at the university writing center as
part of the introduction to my graduate program, it became immediately evident to me
that I would be able to acquire and employ the extensive language of the discipline of
rhetoric and writing studies to tackle the academic questions that I had been unable to
answer. During coursework, I found myself vacillating between thinking that everything
11

is rhetoric to everything is merely rhetorical to imagining a world in which there is no
social construction as we know it, and along with that, no digital technologies, I began to
think more deeply about what counts as rhetoric. Most often, rhetoric has been
conceptualized as a tool of language—the arrangement, composition, and delivery of
words and images and the ways it persuades (Aristotle) and shapes (Scott, 1967;
Brummett, 1979) individual and collective reality. In this way, rhetoric is traditionally
viewed as epistemic, producing what we know through language. I became very
interested in rhetoric as a ‘form of mental energy” (Kennedy, 1992). Prior to Kennedy’s
assertion, however, Aristotle’s concepts of energeia (actuality) and dynamis
(potentiality) “are conjoined ways of existence…with the sort of ambiguity that comes
with its versatility” (Ingraham, 2018). Energy as a rhetorical concept, because of its
philosophical fluidity and (in spite of) “referential elusiveness,” has generated an
abundance of scholarly work in attempting to understand energy as “an inner force of
sorts that can drive and impel work or activity” (Ingraham, 2018). Based on Kennedy’s
notion that “the emotional energy that impels the speaker to speak, the physical energy
expended in the utterance, the energy level encoded in the message, and the energy
experienced by the recipient in decoding the message,” it must be acknowledged that
energy is fundamental to all affect and action, giving vitality to all forms of matter,
human and nonhuman (Kennedy, 1992, p.2 as quoted in Ingraham, 2018). Much of
recent scholarship has followed Kennedy’s lead in decentering the human as the sole
producer of meaning and knowledge through language, spoken and written, and
“place[ing] all things on a more level ontological footing, and to consider our shared
problems more relationally and processually…often evoke “energy” to do so (Ingraham,
2018). Rice (2005, as quoted in Ingraham, 2018) refers to energy as rhetorical enacting
12

“the viral intensities that are circulating in the social field…it is not the situation, but
certain contagions and energy.” Ingraham (2018) refers to Chaput’s (2010)
recommendation that we “pay attention accordingly to the rhetorical energies surging
throughout the concrete sites of our contemporary world,” and offering, for me and this
project, a preliminary glimpse into what might comprise a posthuman writing
curriculum that I discuss in chapter 4 (p. 263). The challenge here, of course, is to
reconceptualize writing and its visual, material manifestations as derived from “an
affective dynamism that cannot be translated into language without loss, although that
makes them no less rhetorical” (Ingraham, 2018, p. 263). I am also brought back to one
of my primary research questions: how do we know what we know without language
helping to construct reality?
For a final paper in a rhetorical history course, I attempted to make the case for
including an ancient American Southwest culture as a rhetorical tradition, even though
there are no written records or verifiable language of the Mogollon people. The remains
of the culture are composed of pottery shards scattered across New Mexico and Arizona
with faint pictographs in cliff dwellings and other caves. These remnants of the culture
suggest for me the centrality of material, human activity on technology and writing and
the interconnectedness between the two. Technology is inherent in writing; writing is
made possible by technologies—from the pencil to the word processor. Aristotle
confirms this relationship as vital to rhetoric as “the available means.” Therefore, one’s
environment is ubiquitous with objects, materials, and humans which all possess
rhetoricity—the quality of being rhetorical, rhetoric’s animation, or possessing the
capacity to communicate, perhaps persuade, or simply leave open to human
interpretation and the very human inclination to connect the dots they can see and feel,
13

given any other unknown or invisible environmental, material, or affective factors. I
remain committed to my claim in the discipline of writing studies to attend to the
affective, rhetorical spaces that exist between humans and nonhumans. Giving language
to the seemingly neutral, invisible spaces between bodies, human and nonhuman, can
offer insight into what matters to writers regarding their relationships with the
materials they write on, with, around, about, and because/in spite of. I must
acknowledge the dissonance these strands of thought and research create in/for
scholarly discussions and debates surrounding materiality, rhetoric, and competing
epistemologies, as I work within and against assertions that conflict with my own.
Language and Power
Ultimately, language is wholly inadequate to respond to an affective, undefinable
range of interactions between materials, both human and nonhuman. This complicates
the teaching of writing in that without the acumen of language to account for and reveal
the affective relations within each (often invisible) material interaction, writing could be
condemned as nothing more than an artificial way of viewing the world, of constructing
a reality that is built for those who use it for their own means and, ultimately, ends
(Katz, 1992). In essence, language in its seemingly infinite uses, is limited and quite
finite because it cannot account for that which no language is sufficient. Words matter
deeply and language is a convenient human ability that embodies the tension between
rhetoric and reality. Words are both instructive and demanding: from the lofty position
of the paper to digital iterations in the form of web sites, social media platforms, and
government documents. They are dually responsible for creating coherence and
imparting division among people and ideas. Words cannot be controlled after they are
set in pencil or ink or through digital publication. They set themselves into motion with
14

both intended and unintended consequences. Words possess the capability to produce
enormous depth and reach—they shape the way we think, act, and engage in the world
and with others. The human reliance on language maintains our stance that we are
superior to all other forms of matter, human and nonhuman. Language reinforces
human power because words do act. The language we adhere to most devotedly is that
which is most comforting, that which is familiar, and that which agrees with our
perception(s) and realities, dreams, and fundamental feelings about who we are or who
we aspire to become. We must recognize that while we may understand our humanity as
being something defined by the ability to use language, that we actually must
understand who we have the potential—the capacity to become—if we consider material,
non-linguistic agents which are not immediately evident but yet ever-present.
Methodology
I have come to understand the role of research is to both highlight problems and
begin the process for finding solutions. I did not have a clear picture as to what this final
project would look like because I did not initially take up a traditional research
methodology, but one that is defined by what Koro-Ljungberg (2016) calls fluid
methodologies, particularly her discussion of incorporeal space that exists within a
methodology. She writes that it requires a kind of intuition that embraces the
uncertainty of knowing, but relies on the experiences of the body, rather than rigidly
following a linear methodology. When research is carried out through traditional
methodologies and inquiry that lack fluidity, we will surely get answers for which we ask
questions. While questions of inquiry are necessary, entering research without a
formulaic approach is key in finding what you didn’t know you didn’t know, and it
accounts for those gaps for which there are no questions or stable answers. The
15

methodological approach I have used in this dissertation has been important, despite its
muddy theoretical exploration. As such, in my attempt to paint rhetoric and writing
studies with a very broad theoretical brush, I have found it difficult to remain within
disciplinary boundaries and, therefore, extended my study beyond the discipline into
quantum physics and animal studies, specifically notions in both fields of study that the
generative, accumulative nature of energy and matter are inherently affective, and
therefore, rhetorical. Given the academic freedom and license granted to me in this
project, I have been able to venture beyond the discipline in ways that I had never
imagined and have been able to integrate many relevant extra-disciplinary ideas into
this project.
This theoretical dissertation employs an integrative literature review as
methodology through which I propose a framework for (re)thinking rhetoric as
posthuman, affective, and therefore, ontological. An integrative literature review
“reviews, critiques, and synthesizes the representative literature on a topic in an
integrated way to generate new frameworks and perspectives on the topic” (Shi et al.,
2020). Torraco (2005) recommends an integrative literature review to “address new or
emerging topics that would benefit from a holistic conceptualization and synthesis of the
literature to date.” This type of methodology is appropriate for the work I have done
here as I have sought to include, in my best effort, the existing literature in the discipline
of rhetoric and writing studies to reveal new ways to approach the ontological,
theoretical, and pedagogical implications for recasting and redefining rhetoric as a
concept and practice that cannot exist solely in the historical disciplinary confines of
rhetoric.
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Figure 1 is a graphic showing the inter- and extra-disciplinary concepts and
philosophies I draw on in my dissertation that make explicit my understandings of how
each of these are defined and, in many cases, overlap. All concepts point toward my
proposed theory of affective rhetoricity through which I investigate how all human and
nonhuman bodies and the seemingly invisible spaces between bodies, can help us
understand rhetorical production as affective.

Figure 1: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework Related to Affective Rhetoricity
Beyond Language
My theoretical study takes up, to an extent, the ancient, ongoing debate between
rhetoric and philosophy, affording me the opportunity to venture beyond rhetoric’s
desire to stabilize knowledge through form and structure—through primarily linguistic
means—which severely limits the philosophical implications and possibilities for
expanding rhetoric’s reach and purview, even though Western philosophers refer to the
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20th century as the century of language. While this integrative literature review provides
a careful and thorough examination of the scholarly contributions within rhetoric and
writing studies that have taken up theories of the posthuman and affect studies, it is by
no means exhaustive. As a continuation of this project and inspired by Cox and Faris’
(2015) annotated bibliography of LGBTQ rhetorics, in the near future I plan to develop a
digital annotated bibliography of the body of work that is currently informing the
disciplinary study of affect studies within rhetoric and writing studies.
Beyond Traditional Research
Although this is a theoretically broad, nontraditional conceptualization of
research, I have also come to understand that the ways in which research has
historically been conducted, which here I refer to as traditional research, is categorized
by a need to unearth truths about people and the world, often at the expense of both.
Burke (1935) referred to this risk as “trained incapacities” in which that what we are
looking for is capaciously limited by that which we have been socially constructed to
look for and, eventually, find. Adams St. Pierre (2014), in her historical tracing of
qualitative research, suggests that “critique does not begin with the assumption that
what is exists is wrong or in error; rather, critique examines the assumptions that
structure the discursive and the nondiscursive, the linguistic and the material, words
and things, the epistemological and the ontological in order to foreground
the...unnatural nature of what exists” (p. 3-4). Even though there is an ontological issue
with only using words to describe the world, I feel that this idea is closely aligned with
the notion that research should seek to reveal realities, rather than to paint truths.
While it is helpful to understand traditional research methodologies, these differences in
thinking about the ways we search for answers is staggering when language is
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considered: packaging up a set of guidelines for “doing research” reinforces the idea that
the researcher will be able to find what they are looking for if these rules are followed.
However more comfortable we are with truth in a box, research based on the quest for
objectivity is seemingly black and white, but by not venturing outside the quantitative
box, researchers run the risk of contributing to both old and new constructs that are
both objectifying and dehumanizing, as evidenced by research paradigms. On the
contrary, many scholars in rhetoric and writing studies have utilized more open
perspectives and worked to decenter language in their research approaches in an effort
to reveal what really matters through methodologies using photography, drawing, and
sound (Walton, 2015; Evia, 2012; Dura; 2021). The most recent edition of Kairos
features works in sound and social change, particularly the Border Soundscapes project
which reveals sounds as “an otherwise overlooked acoustic reality” through which place
and rhetorical situatedness on the border can be more fully heard (Flores & Dura, 2021).
The podcast Rhetoricity interviews scholars about unlikely convergences in their
research that produce meaning for them and their work; one poignant podcast featured
Diane Davis who examines laughter as an excess of language and, therefore, further
qualifying sound and utterances outside of words and language as rhetorical. Many
more scholars have explored rhetoric beyond the confines of language and in
conjunction with a slew of objects, situations, materials, and interactions, both human
and nonhuman (Barnett & Boyle, 2016).
Academic research requires legitimization by the institution; however, by
working within the confines of the construct of traditional research methods, the
researcher can expect to gain little else beyond that which is sought. Within the
legitimization of knowledge through academic research, the researcher is endowed with
19

the “power to label, name, condemn, describe, or prescribe solutions to challenges in
former colonized, indigenous peoples and historically oppressed groups” (Chilisa, 2012,
p. 7). He contends that research should be conducted “without perpetuating self-serving
Western research paradigms that construct Western ways of knowing as superior to the
Other’s ways of knowing” (Chilisa, 2012, p. 7). Traditional research practices, as I
understand them, focus on generating knowledge according to the researcher’s
background and ideologies, rather than the search for knowledge in “living,
experiencing, material interactions, intuition, and subject-object relations without clear
or direct signifier-signified links...research and findings can be more about meaningmaking processes than outcomes, more about questions than answers...and more about
exploration than delivery” (Koro-Ljungberg, 2016, p. 19). This way of thinking about
knowledge requires a turn toward the notion that knowledge cannot be objectified, if we
are to find any useful understanding of the world and humanity. A posthuman, affective
view of rhetoric averts this objectification through a conscious consideration of all
material interactions that help us compose knowledge through an understanding that
knowledge is temporal and always unfolding.
Koro-Ljungberg (2016) discusses the current trajectory of research
methodologies which have taken an ontological turn which invokes new materialism as
a lens for studying intricacies and interactions between bodies and materials, human
and nonhuman. This intrigues me, particularly because I am interested in how we are
shaped by our environments in conjunction with language and how that continual
shaping and construction determines what we produce in terms of writing and other
material. The ways in which we interact with the world are important for understanding
composition as a natural process through which bodies and matter interact. Similarly,
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Appadurai (2006) suggests that traditional research methods and methodologies
remove “the capacity to aspire” in people who do not have traditional access in “gaining
relevant new knowledge.” That is, if the knowledge is packaged up and delivered, then
there is no reason to want to find out more or to engage in research to build knowledge
for the self.
Sapienza (2007) highlights the necessity of negotiating additional roles and
positionalities alongside being the researcher in order to both understand the group and
also become part of it, which ultimately allows the scholar to better project and
represent groups which may be served well by bringing their issues to light in a
constructive, respectful way. Aligned with Tuck (2009), avoiding research practices that
avoid perpetuating deficiencies in people through “damage-centered research” is yet
another step in reconceptualizing traditional methods of research. Unfortunately, the
word “research” tends to elicit negative connotations and provokes the idea that
research is done to find and correct deficiencies, and when applied to people, this is of
course ruinous and contributes to the power of the dominant ideology.
Positionality
My positionality calls on me to understand the implicit, unearned privilege
whiteness has afforded me, so that I can better understand the ways in which people
have experienced dehumanization and oppression within the strong grip of white,
Western ideology and research practices. I also realize that I cannot fully know what it is
to be marginalized or Othered in society. As a white woman, and by understanding the
role of whiteness as an invisible racializing force that seeks to both encompass and
divide, I think I am automatically obliged to enter academic research with the intent of
practicing reflexivity from the beginning. Basically, I know that I cannot know the lived
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experiences of all people, despite the ways race has been constructed and defined by
categorizing people. Additionally, I feel it’s important to act on what you know: if I
understand that there exists the systemic racism within education systems, then I have
the responsibility as an educator and scholar to disrupt “dominant narratives” as a way
to challenge practices that “cast non-white students, teachers, and college faculty as
either potentially or conclusively deficient.” Similarly, Cushman (1998) approaches her
research in such a way that challenges the notion that not only are people not deficient
in the ways we are led to believe, but that they demonstrate resistance to hegemony
through language. It is through this recognition and building of relationships that
connections can be made and consequently revealed. In chapter 3, I outline a framework
for affective rhetoricity which can help us build on our understanding of rhetoric as an
ontological disposition and, therefore, can be useful in rethinking the teaching of
writing.
This dissertation is organized according to the relationships I have drawn
between posthumanism, affect, rhetoric, writing, and ethics, in conjunction with my
primary research questions:
•

What is in the invisible spaces between material bodies?

•

How do we know what we know when nothing concrete can be pointed to
as the source of knowledge?

Thus, chapter 2 reviews scholarship that informs an ontological understanding of
posthumanism within and beyond the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies and lays
the foundation for the thinking required to accept affect as integral to rhetoric. In
addition to putting forth a framework for affective rhetoricity, Chapter 3 characterizes
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affect’s natural relationship with rhetoric and makes the case for understanding all
bodies as possessing affective rhetoricity—embodying rhetoric as inherently affective.
Chapter 4 details the ethical implications for affective rhetoricity in rhetoric and writing
instruction. In my concluding chapter, I offer insight into my own entanglements and
capacities for enacting the scholarly work and disposition I advocate for in this
dissertation.
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Chapter 2: The Posthuman Turn in Rhetoric and Writing Studies
Kennedy (1992) makes the case for rhetoric as energy, marking a credible,
disciplinary shift in which rhetoric no longer belongs solely to the human. His research
on bees provides even greater insight into rhetoric as energy, beyond the confines of
language; Kennedy’s discussion of the bees reminds me of my own origins, which I
explain in chapter 5. Kennedy asserts that honeybees are engaged in deliberative
rhetoric, engaging in “waggle dances…by which they provide each other with specific
information about the direction and distance of supplies of nectar” (Kennedy, 1998, p.
18-19). The swarm acts once the queen leaves the group. Messenger bees gather
information about taking up residence in a new hive and, after making a plan, the queen
rejoins the group. The bees’ interactions are communicative. While communication can
often be construed as synonymous with language, I define language here as an
exclusively human communicative expression. Human interaction with nonhuman
animals (and insects), however, provides another lens to look through as the field of
rhetoric and writing studies turns more convincingly toward rhetoric as energetic and
existing prior to communication--affecting all forms of human and nonhuman life. We
can then more appropriately and effectively acknowledge our relationships with
nonhuman animals and their processes from which most humans directly benefit,
reinforcing the argument that a posthuman rhetoric is a more enduring concept that
demands inclusion of humans, nonhumans, and everything beyond.
Since its disciplinary inception in the 1960s, rhetoric and writing studies has
experienced a turbulence—in effect, a “lack of epistemological clarity”—in defining
rhetoric, defining composition, determining what it means to teach the two, and
capturing, specifically, what it means to do rhetoric and why it matters. This turbulence
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is constituted by the indeterminacy imbued in language and ontology, which is why the
discipline itself has had the tendency to concede to institutional demands for teaching
writing (Skinnell, 2016), effectively compromising the integrity of the discipline even as
one that is often classified as a metadiscipline—borrowing theories, concepts, and
practices from other disciplines that do have a more linguistically stable knowledge
base. The metadisciplinarity of rhetoric and writing studies equips the discipline by
setting parameters as to what rhetoric is and is not and how those boundaries are
determined. As a discipline that is equitably, albeit debatably and reciprocally, focused
on theory and practice, it is imperative for scholars and practitioners to have a firm
grasp of rhetoric as an expansive concept, even as its disciplinary clarification is limited
by language. It is not to suggest that disciplinary scholars and practitioners should have
the same understanding of rhetoric, but they should consciously consider the expansion
of rhetoric beyond language, toward the material turn, as constituted by affect.
Ontological Shifts
By placing ourselves and our humanness in a central position in which we matter
most, we have inadvertently prioritized how we are affected by the world and have been
unable to recognize how we are networked in ways that are invisible and which
effectively flatten our materially superior status among all human and nonhuman
matter. There’s a certain reciprocity built into the humancentric view that in which the
world we have created returns to us what we have constructed; however, Micciche
(2014) suggests that we have consequently limited “what counts as the social by
foregrounding the constructed nature of texts, objects, activities, and bodies with little
attention to how such constructions interact with natural systems, biology, animals, and
other forms of matter” (p. 488). By acknowledging the human and nonhuman bodies
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and externalities that ultimately inform our minds and bodies, we can more easily
realize and accept that which shapes our realities and our truths, however contingent.
The value in reassessing our human ontological stance is that by understanding what we
know and how we come to know is determinate of the way we approach life in all
forms—strictly from a position of superiority and always in search of what can be known
through language, apart from groups like animal activists and Jain.
The posthuman turn in the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies demands an
orientation toward a material reality that ontologically enables us to make sense of the
complexities we find ourselves wrestling with. It is this tendency to objectify that which
we find can be of use to us, that we can benefit from, that we can exert control and
power over, that causes us to think that we are separate, and therefore superior, to all
other forms of matter, environmental, demographic, geopolitical, and economic change”
(Coole & Frost, 2010). Historically, we have been concerned with the activities of the
human and the effects of the world on humanity, as well as human ability to construct
and deconstruct. Currently, the world is experiencing environmental, social, and
political crises of unprecedented magnitude, which can be attributed to our inability to
articulate the fundamental ways in which we are writing on the world as we have been
written by the world. In this way, we are products and produce through the available
means, which have been historically built with/from a constructivist bent built through
language and discourse (Coole & Frost, 2010). This theoretical study of the posthuman
and resulting posthumanism, intentionally questions what it means to be human, and as
a result, posthuman. Rhetoric, in light of the “distributed character of the posthuman,”
must be reconceived as “an art of connectivity ... [and] asks for new considerations from
multiple angles ... [from] literature, science, critical theory, argumentation, cultural
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studies, et cetera (with emphasis on the et cetera)” (Muckelbauer and Hawhee, 2000, p.
770).
In this chapter, I trace definitions and concepts of the posthuman both within
and beyond the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies to conceptualize how rhetoric
comes to be redefined, once again, outside the traditional understandings and the now
commonly accepted precept that rhetoric is epistemic and, consequently, not only
mediates but also produces our knowledge. Rhetoric, as a concept, offers an opportunity
for developing a disposition toward rhetoric aligned with what Rutherford and Palmeri
(2016) claim: a study of rhetoric and composition should begin from an ontological
position. The ways we view being in the world completely inform how we understand
and what we know about the world, even why we do what we do, the choices we believe
we make, and the ways and being by which we make sense of things. If we privilege
language and rhetoric in its linguistic and textual forms as the central way of knowing,
we are merely reasserting our presupposed superiority through language. Rhetoric, as
energy, occurs prior to language and, therefore, language can only be taken at face value.
This orientation toward language limits the ways we can view rhetoric to include objects,
materials, bodies, and all their interactions; we can better approach the practice and
teaching of rhetoric as a way of viewing the world—an ontology guided by a way of being
rather than merely a way of knowing as defined by epistemology. A privileging of
ontology over epistemology is advantageous in that it requires us to accept that which is
unknown, rather than what is already known. Even the scholarly convergence of the
disciplinary concepts of rhetoric and posthumanism suggests a reflection of this
ontology that perhaps we don’t fully recognize who we are as humans. As humans, we
are continually insisting who we think we are by each time we stare into our screens to
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find entertainment, delight, and a comfortable space in which we feel good about who
we think we are—how beautiful, obnoxious, or daring we can be—effectively confirming
our own bias toward ourselves.
Contours of Posthumanism
Posthumanism is not a “theoretical sequel to humanism,” but is constitutive of a
“deeper ontological challenge of what it means to be human at all” (Trader, 2013, p.
203). The concept of the posthuman is mirrored for us in the highly contextualized,
distributed, networked interactions of the everyday. In effect, not only are we always
already posthuman, but we are doing posthuman rhetoric in the sense that we are being
who we are. Once more, each time we open a digital social media platform, we are seeing
a reflection of who we believe ourselves to be. It is the relationship between rhetoric and
what it means to be human that drives this rhetorical study. To engage the complexity of
communicating in a posthuman society, then, rhetorical theory needs to turn to the
posthuman perspective to foreground how thoroughly we are enmeshed in “network
culture” (Taylor, 2001, as cited in Trader, 2013). In this sense, the current and
overriding disciplinary ontology toward rhetoric of taking, gathering, manipulating
words, visuals, sounds, materials—utilizing the available means—to inform human
rhetoric must be revised entirely, in consideration of the fact that rhetoric as an energy,
as a preexisting force that is constitutive of function and meaning, is far more relevant
to rhetoric’s core than anything that humans can tangibly control.
The Posthuman
While it may be tempting to merely perceive the posthuman as a human being
with material, technological extensions in direct relation to the human body, the
existential question of what it means to be human is a more appropriate pursuit for
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thinking about the concept of the posthuman outside of a mere rearticulation of the
liberal human subject (Braidotti, 2013; Hayles, 1999; Worsham, 2014). Hayles (1999)
conceptualizes the posthuman as “a point of view” that considers the “body as the
original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body
with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were
born ... [and] reconfigures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with
intelligent machines” (p. 3). More importantly for the discussion of the posthuman in
the context of rhetoric and writing studies and for the purpose(s) of reconceptualizing
rhetoric outside of the boundaries of the human body, Hayles (1999) suggests that
“there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence
and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot
teleology, and human goals” (p. 3). More recently, scholars in rhetoric and writing
studies have explored the affective embodiments of wearable technology (Tham &
Garskie, 2017; Gouge & Jones, 2016). The posthuman subject is “an amalgam, a
collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose
boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction” (Hayles, 1999, p. 3).
Furthermore, human agency is made complex through distributed cognition, replacing
the ideal that “human essence is freedom from the wills of others,” and while “the
posthuman is “post” not because it is necessarily unfree but because there is no a priori
way to identify a self-will that can be clearly distinguished from an other-will” (Hayles,
1999, p. 4). It is not enough to suggest that the posthuman body is one that is mediated
by digital or electronic device, for that would be too easy to separate the human from the
posthuman, which inadvertently sets up another humanistic opportunity to categorize
and separate within the continued influence and control of social construction,
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especially as we consider the effects of social media on people as divisive and, yet,
creating the illusion of unification. Rather, the posthuman is defined by “the
construction of subjectivity, not the presence of nonbiological components” (Hayles,
1999, p. 4). In this regard, the posthuman is characterized by an “emphasis on cognition
... which celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that understands human
life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for
our continued survival” (Hayles, 1999, p. 5). Recognizing that humans have always been
posthuman suggests that the human as a “stable, coherent self” is a philosophy that
supports the epistemology of the knower and known in that the human is the locus of
thought intrinsic to humans effectively establishing a “stable, coherent reality” (Hayles,
1999, p. 285). These contextual, epistemological certainties were propagated by those
whose “wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings
exercis[ed] their will through individual agency and choice” giving way to devising this
epistemology as constructed through the presence and groundedness of the body, and
consequently, the self (Hayles, 1999, p. 286).
Hayles (1999) further suggests that the “posthuman evokes the exhilarating
prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking
about what being human means” (p. 285). Therefore, thinking posthuman is a
consciousness that foregrounds a cognitive relationality that is both unknowable and
undefinable through the concept of the self as outlined by humanism. It is characterized
by a randomness that “exists outside the confines of the box in which a system is
located; it is the larger and unknowable complexity for which the perceptual processes
of an organism are a metaphor” (Bateson, 1972 as paraphrased in Hayles, 1999).
Posthumanism is fundamentally a revisit to the concept of the human that has been
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traditionally connected to the idea that the human is central to thought, and that
“rational” human thought is more relevant than any other way of knowing. It is a
revision of the concept of the human in which the human is not removed, discontinued,
or abandoned, but one that humans have powerfully extolled regarding their selfidentified privileged position in which their epistemic “reality” comes to a screeching
halt. Hayles (1999) suggests that the posthuman “does not really mean the end of
humanity…it signals instead the end of a certain conception of the human…as
autonomous being(s) exercising their will through individual agency and choice” (p.
286). Posthumanism allows new conceptions of the human that do not rely on the
human as a single source of knowing and power.
Posthumanism
Trader (2013) suggests that posthumanism—as a departure (but not
rearticulation) from postmodernism, which focuses on subjectivities as fragmented and
disconnected, rather than interrelated and networked—is defined as the theoretical and
cultural movements away from the deeper faith in an anthropocentric ideology that has
informed nearly five hundred years of Western philosophy and common sense” (p. 201).
Worsham (2013) suggests that posthumanism “makes explicit the fact that what has
counted as knowledge and as a knowing subject has been decisively limited by our
species-being” (p. 52). In other words, how we make sense of the world is of our own
construction and knowledge-making practices, which is effectively limiting and without
consideration that “humanism has denied human finitude”—precisely, the fact of human
embodiment and human evolution as a “specific form of animality,” rather than the
human as a full and complete transcendence away from animals (p. 52). Halberstam
and Livingston (1995, as cited in Muckelbauer and Hawhee, 2000) suggest that
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posthumanism “emerge[s] at nodes where bodies, bodies of discourse, and discourses of
bodies intersect to foreclose any easy distinction between actor and stage, between
sender/receiver, channel, code, message, context.” For Muckelbauer and Hawhee
(2000), posthumanism is “an attempt to engage humans as distributed processes rather
than as discrete entities... [which] pose[s] intriguing questions to longstanding “selfevident” assumptions about rhetoric and communication, broadly conceived.”
Posthumanism is an acknowledgement that humans, like all other nonhuman bodies,
objects, and interactions are defined by processes and an interrelatedness that produces
and is produced through an often-invisible temporality and affectivity—characterized by
instantaneous convergences that are fleeting, in conjunction with a body’s capacity to
affect and be affected. In reconceiving rhetoric through posthumanism, language and
rhetoric’s linguistic forms can be removed as the central feature of rhetoric as it is
currently and traditionally understood.
Animal Studies as a Bridge to Posthumanism
Worsham (2014) discusses the relevance of animal studies to the posthuman turn
in academia, which “has successfully blurred the boundaries between human and
animal and has pressed for recognition of the “animality” of the human, the human as
one species among other species” (p. 20). Posthumanism pushes the boundaries of the
discipline of rhetoric and writing studies which “become sites of connection rather than
enclosures of autonomous interiorities” (Muckelbauer and Hawhee, 2000, p. 770).
Fundamental to a traditional liberal education is the epistemic focus on producing and
maintaining “a knowing subject ... deemed capable of critical consciousness through
introspection and self-reflection,” and it is this ontological positioning that reinforces
the idea that the human is the only one capable of what liberal humanism propagates as
32

knowledge. The human being has evolved over time to reflect what Worsham (2014)
characterizes as kind of endemic human trauma, “experiences...that exceed the mind’s
ability to grasp it fully, to take it in and assimilate it to existing frameworks of meaning
and value...a difficulty of reality” (p. 32). Humans use language as the primary tool to
counter the effects of the ongoing evolutionary, historical conflict and resulting realityinduced trauma. When interactions occur that we cannot readily see, we are unable to
process or accept these events. We simply cannot make sense of that which we cannot
cognitively process. This could explain why we humans are so easily captivated by
companies and product dispensaries like Amazon which mirrors the simultaneous
human desire to connect to everything and while remaining disconnected and superior,
all the while contemplating how we can remain in control of our being, both collective
and individual. This ontological paradox represents the internal struggle and the trauma
that results when we do not win with our insistence that language is the “one that will
save us,” but all the language and words and documents in the world, including all
materials and other forms of matter will not save us from ourselves. It is the human
condition to uncover what is over the next hill, around the next bend, beyond the
horizon, but it is virtually impossible to know because we do not always see that we are
not in total control of our own trajectory, to an extent greater than we care to admit.
Language and Trauma
To better understand and accept who we truly are as humans, Worsham (2014)
suggests that our collective “traumatic exposure” has resulted in “a profound narrowing
and numbing of consciousness and perception to the point that one simply does not see
the difficulty of the reality of another animal’s suffering, does not see one’s connection
to suffering” (p. 41). The suffering experienced during the pandemic, for example, has
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reminded people of their interrelatedness to others and that we are living in a fragile,
unstable world. In other ways, I feel that people have grown more disconnected with one
another because of the rhetoric born out of the crisis. To think posthuman is about
letting go of our focus on orchestrating life to avoid pain and conflict, experiencing
death—physical, material, metaphorical—as a part of life and part of that death has to do
with the experience of pain. We have looked to language as a salve for our innate drive
to simultaneously resist, but necessarily engage, with conflict. This is where who we
have always been is who we are now, we just don’t seem to recognize it because the
world is so cluttered with the linguistic and material remnants of social construction and
the socio-material effects of late capitalism. In turning toward the materiality of life to
engage, we turn away from the being that is human, the one that is wrestling precisely
with nothing in pursuit of a something, as Heidegger suggests. This is our (seemingly
inescapable) human ontology in which our understanding of everything social, foremost
and including rhetoric, must be understood—not only as paradoxical—but as stifling in
that turning away from ourselves, essentially, toward things is inherently disruptive to
knowing in relation to being.
Language is ontologically definable in that it serves as the principal human
attempt to counter and wrestle with the relevance and palpability of the nothingness
that is productive of being, and as Heidegger suggests, “in the malaise of anxiety we
often try to shatter the vacant stillness with compulsive talk ... [which] only proves the
presence of nothing” (Krell, 1993, pg. 101). In other words, the human aptitude for
language has cemented an anthropocentric power against all other forms of being, and
as Barad (2003) emphasizes “language has been granted too much power” (p. 801).
Language, for humans, is not only the central way we understand the world, but the way
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that we maintain and exert power over and beyond all other forms of matter, both
human and nonhuman. This recognition is vital to explaining why rhetoric, viewed
through a posthuman lens, is so drastically altered apart from anything that has to do
with language.
Worsham (2014) exemplifies language as a human tool to combat the anxietyproducing effects of reality, as it is a “practice of deflection that move[s] attention away
from exposure to the difficult reality of bodily life and death ... [and] move[s] attention
to a kind of thinking done with concepts and categories and positions taken and
defended—that is, to a kind of thinking identified as abstract and deemed exclusively
human” (p. 38). It is the codified knowledge produced by language and, consequently,
rhetoric, that we have identified as the existential mainstay of being human; however, by
virtue of the fact that no rhetorical utterance is made without some need to
counter/convince/affirm/deny a belief on part of the rhetor or the audience, human use
of language is simply a counter to what is not readily available through the
environment—which could be viewed as the affectual relationship we have with
language, contrary to enlightenment notions that there exists a single, objective reality
achieved in which language offers an imperfect approximation. Language can be viewed
as an expression of that which cannot be immediately understood in terms of the
material relationship; however, these material relationships seem straightforward, but
they are anything but.
The linguistic ability of humans to assign, label, categorize, and therefore,
concretize has helped secure our standing as exceptional to all other forms of being and
matter because, as Worsham (2014) argues,
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humans ... are creatures who habitually wield conceptual categories as if they
were descriptions of reality when in fact they are deeply interested
interpretations of reality. Humans are the creatures who use those conceptual
categories to exclude others (human and nonhuman others) from moral
consideration and to rationalize and justify actual violence against those we
consign to the category “animal.” (p. 24)
It is through language that we categorize, thereby continue emphasizing differences
between and among bodies, both human and nonhuman. Our collective, decidedly
human, ability to employ language to communicate, persuade, influence, and
essentially, exert power “is the foundation ... the origin, of all practices of othering—of
claiming and justifying, first, human exceptionalism and then, of claiming the
superiority of particular groups who are seem as belonging legitimately in the category
“human” (Worsham, 2014, p. 24). Without language, it is true we would be more like
“animals,” however, our linguistic ability mediates our thoughts which, in turn,
mediates our actions. Language is a tool that structures thought and does enable us to
make sense of the world in a “human” way. We hold language responsible for helping us
parse out that which we cannot immediately make sense of, so in the absence of another,
less violent means for categorization, language proves to be the method by which
humans “animalize” others for the sake of “domination, oppression, or even genocide”
(Worsham, 2014, p. 25). To animalize would be to cast humans as less than human and
devoid of reason and logic; to objectify would be to view humans as tools, a means to an
end, having a singular purpose. Language essentially permits humans to compensate for
our feelings that we are vulnerable and mortal through “reassert[ing] our
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distinctiveness” by way of the linguistic “violent reaffirmation” that is categorization and
the continual, self-persuasive drawing out of difference.
Avoiding Conflict through Linguistic Deflection
To what degree are we constructed through our impetus to use language for the
purposes of communication and persuasion? Because we have ascribed argument as
rational and as an “antidote” to our animality as humans, we have been able to avoid the
reality of humanness that has not only always defined our material existence, but
language has served to help us attempt to grasp, stabilize, understand, ground, and even
avoid a reality that is always unstable, unfolding, and temporal. Language enables a
steady reflection for humans to view their standing in that it reifies our superior
standing to all other forms of life, and this disposition and reliance on language has
skewed reality in a way that makes it seem as though we are not bi-pedal animals, but
something far more advanced—as evidenced by our ability to construct. Worsham
(2014) calls this the “art of deflection”—a theoretical perspective “understood as forms
of conceptual or symbolic violence ... not simply or simplistically as the antidote or
alternative to violence” (p. 36). In other words, language does not assume a superior
position as civil interventionist but uses its power to overtake the other—especially over
those humans or non-humans it deems inferior. Humans have consistently relied on
language as a peace offering to alleviate conflict and avoid physical harm and violence,
but language is simply a tool to deflect reality—“an inevitable feature of our habitual and
ordinary mode of thinking and responding to the world through language”—as Burke
suggests (1966, as cited in Worsham, 2014, p. 30). The recognition that we do not and
cannot know forces us to put language to that fear and unknowing. Kristeva (1982, as
cited in Worsham, 2014) says that we use language and “metaphorizing to keep from
37

being frightened to death” (p. 31). Language is a protective and powerful shield against
the reality of our existence and serves as reinforcement in favor of the human as
completely separate from the animal. Rapid technological advancement has further
entrenched humans in these thoughts that, perhaps, we are posthuman by virtue of the
fact that we can invent, argue, transform through language and technology, but this
orientation toward the discursive only reinforces our turn away from reality—which is
not nearly as seductive. The human aptitude for language as it has historically served as
a defense, which undoubtedly qualifies it as the primary, most available tool for rhetoric
as a tool of persuasion. After all, persuasion is an attempt to defend oneself in favor of
convincing another of our own reality, rather than considering or adopting an alternate
view. It is much more convenient to try to persuade in our own favor rather than to
remain open to the possibilities of a more cooperative approach with the materials and
beings, both nonhuman and human, which compose our individual and collective
environments. In other words, through persuasive language, humans believe they have
control of other humans.
Agency
In contrast to understanding rhetoric through social construction as theorized
within the discourses of postmodernism, posthumanism—in conjunction with new
materialist theories accounts for the ways in which matter is active and forms a central
coexistence along with humans—
reconfigures agency in relation to individuals, things, and publics by delinking
assumed relations between action and causality, generating instead diffuse,
unstable configurations of blame and responsibility that make for less clear
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targets but for more robust accounting of the interstitial qualities of any single
problem. (Micciche, 2014, p. 491)
Human agency is therefore rearticulated as distributed and co-constitutive of material
relationships and the affectual spaces between them. Hayles (1999) suggests that the
posthuman view affects the ways we have typically understood human will in that
posthuman agency is highly distributed. The posthuman turn demands an orientation
toward these material relationships, both human and nonhuman, which ontologically
enables us to make sense of the economic, environmental, and political complexities we
find ourselves wrestling with (Coole & Frost, 2010). Important also is the idea that
“subjectivities [are] constituted as open series of capacities or potencies that emerge
hazardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes,” which
complicates previous understandings of the stable, knowing subject associated with
modernism or the disembodied, fragmented subject associated with postmodernism.
(Coole & Frost, 2010, p. 10). Because of our intensely digital existence, we are often
unable to articulate how or what we are influenced by, therefore a critical reexamination
of the materiality of our lives can help us understand our relationships with one
another, our relationships with technology, and our relationships with ourselves,
especially as humans continue experiencing rapid climate change, social and racial
conflict, and an ever-present threat of pandemics.
Posthuman Rhetoric
Rhetoric and writing studies have traditionally “relied on the rhetorical canon
and social construction as central explanatory systems of writing and communication ...
[which are] not adventurous enough to match the creative complexities of our time”
(Micciche, 2014, p. 497). In a disciplinary attempt to capture and confine rhetoric and
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defend its meanings and purposes, we have consequently limited our thinking “with
little attention to how such constructions interact with natural systems, biology,
animals, and other forms of matter” (Micciche, 2014). Micciche (2014) bridges a gap
between theory and practice by attending to the affective turn in composition studies
that is characterized by a relationality across bodies and texts, therefore informing the
practice and teaching of writing. Micciche (2014) relates her understanding of book
acknowledgements as evidence of the relevance of material relationships between a
writer and his or her interactions with those things and people in the environment. She
regards these acknowledgements as crucial in understanding how people do writing and
what affects writing activities, in line with what Hayles (2010) regards as important in
considering the “materiality of the artifacts with which we’re intimately concerned.” The
posthuman, according to Hayles (1999), possesses a “collective heterogeneous quality
[which] implies a distributed cognition located in disparate parts that may be in only
tenuous communication with one another” (p. 3-4). This instability of communication is
precisely definitive of communication, even though we try desperately to make it matter,
for it is the most available—and most slippery—means of persuasion for humans. This is
how power is exerted throughout a posthuman rhetoric—by cognitively integrating, we
cannot assume so much power, and therefore, we realize our human vulnerability. In
de-privileging humans as central to collective power and individual agency in the world,
we must turn to a more robust accounting of that which is collectively agential.
A posthuman rhetoric is devoted to “decenter[ing] the humanist subject from its
position of privilege and account for persuasion as a dynamic that cultivates change in
the world” (Trader, 2013, p. 203). Power is redistributed away from, but inclusive of, the
human along with an infinite host of other materials, both human and nonhuman. As a
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dissolution of boundaries that have traditionally upheld the human in resolute power, a
posthuman rhetoric reconfigures our relationship with ourselves, as well as our
relationships with all other forms of “enmeshed and indistinct” matter” (Muckelbauer
and Hawhee, 2000, p. 771). When we recognize our tendency to privilege ourselves over
all other forms of matter, human and nonhuman, posthumanism calls attention to the
codification of our “knowledge” and the ability to “ignore and disconnect” in an effort to
maintain privileged standing—by ignoring and disconnecting, in other words, humans
maintain agential power which, again, prevents us from moving forward out of constant
material conflict. Contrary to the human attempt to retain power through the final word,
the redistribution of agency within a posthuman rhetoric requires us to acknowledge the
complexity of subjectivity as far more nuanced and not simply based on the humanist
materiality of Baudrillard and Marx. It’s simply too easy to look at the material before
us, that we have created and draw connections to power, with humans in the drivers’
seat.
Accepting the Posthuman Paradox
The postmodern view of subjectivity as highly fragmented and disconnected–that
embodiment is fractured, and therefore, when knowledge, for example is codified and
categorized, we can more easily make sense of how and what we know. The view of
subjectivity within the discourses of rhetorical studies “assumes the rational
communication of self-identical meaning, the a priori coherence of the autonomous
human agent, and the intentional application of power to effect change” (Trader, 2013,
p. 202). Trader (2013) suggests that the “collapse of subject and object ... highlights an
orientation not toward exclusion but toward the inclusive combinations of both/and,”
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pointing to the complex plurality of the posthuman—in effect, extrahuman—who is not
less than human, but “more fully imbricated with/in the world” (p. 202).
The narrow singularity of humanism has effectively left humans in the lurch,
scrambling to make sense of rhetorical situations permeated by complexities, bodies,
and their interactions (Trader, 2013). In so much as we want to simplify, connect, and
compartmentalize to a great extent when we ourselves are so biologically,
environmentally, materially, digitally (inwardly and outwardly) networked. Trader
(2013) suggests that the goal of posthumanism is not to “preserve the humanist subject,”
which would effectively continue to relinquish, relegate, and centralize all power to the
human, but accept the paradox that is the posthuman condition. The uncertainty that
humans so fervently turn away from is precisely what must be embraced: it is not
necessarily up to us to comprehend everything we see and feel, but to cultivate an
ontological disposition toward the complexity as a rearticulation of our humanness so
that we can make better, more ethical decisions and perhaps come to innovative
problem-solving strategies for major issues (e.g., climate change, social relations)
through a better understanding of our tangled existence. Muckelbauer and Hawhee
(2000) call for rhetorical studies scholars think less of “attempting to reduce the
complexity of actual events ... [and] rethinking rhetoric that would encourage us to
engage this complexity and respond to it” (p. 769). Furthermore, this complexity which
we cannot fully comprehend, calls into question our human capacity to act effectively
and ethically.
Gries (2015) offers an account of visual rhetoric that mirrors the ontological
disposition constituted by an agential relationality that foregrounds a posthuman
rhetoric. If we humans do not act alone, then how does the concept and practice of
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rhetoric belong only to humans? Gries (2015) asserts that agency is “a doing” and is
constituted by attention to “a thing’s external relations [which] are just as important in
creating the conditions necessary for manipulating reality” (p. 57). A posthuman
rhetorical stance would suggest that material, both human and nonhuman, relationships
are most nearly all that matters for the capacity of anyone or anything to act. Agency is
distributed (Gries, 2015), intra-active (Barad, 2007), and material and therefore,
epistemic (McIntyre, 2015). A feminist, and decidedly posthuman, account of agency
recognizes the “networks of material and immaterial forces that inform rhetorical
agency ... [as] human rhetoric cannot achieve their goals without relying on and/or
responding to other humans and without relying on and/or being constrained by
surrounding nonhumans” (McIntyre, 2015, p. 25). In consideration of the material,
ecological nature of our environments and that human agency is wholly comprised of a
range of actors, both human and nonhuman, effectively forcing the human to recognize
that not only are we not, as previously thought, in total control of our lives. Rather, we
are participants inter/intra-acting with our surroundings, resulting in vibrant (Bennett,
2010) and incorporeal (Grosz, 2018) relationships, which I discuss in chapter 3.
This chapter has reviewed rhetoric through the theoretical lens of posthumanism
and offers us the opportunity to examine the current and historic value we have
assigned to language. Through posthumanism, we are presented with the chance to
reconsider who we have the capacity to become—beyond the structure of language as
central to human thought and perception. Chapter 3 draws on affect theory within and
beyond the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies, and I propose a preliminary,
definitional framework for affective rhetoricity.
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Chapter 3: A Theory of Affective Rhetoricity
This dissertation project arose from an intense grappling with the theories of new
materialism and posthumanism—outside the discipline of rhetoric and writing studies.
While I had read Rhetoric Through Everyday Things (Barnett & Boyle, 2015) and Still
Life with Rhetoric (Gries, 2015) in a graduate course, I struggled to understand the
philosophy behind the idea that objects are agential—that they act independently of
human agency and action: how could humans not influence material objects or events?
How do things act? I was intrigued by ideas that our material surroundings act
on/without us. In my own life, I have always been keenly attuned to how things have
made me feel: the humid stickiness of my spandex shorts in the long bus ride from
school to home in the 2nd grade, the smell of bacon and basmati emanating from my
grandmother’s kitchen, the sheer exhilaration of kissing the tiny face of my first
daughter seconds after her birth. However sentimental I am about my own feelings,
these human experiences are not unique or exclusive. What is unique is how these
materials we live with, on, and around act on us, and in particular ways, evoke responses
that form and sustain relationships with these objects, events, and other humans. This is
precisely why humans have privileged themselves over all other forms of matter: we
have thought that because we are able to know to think to write that we have somehow
cognitively surpassed our ancient, prehistoric origins. We have not. In fact, without all
these other forms of matter, we would have nothing to know, nothing to think, nothing
to write. Our material surroundings are not merely influential to who we are, but
intrinsic to our being and writing in the world.
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Historically, rhetoric has been primarily defined as both a linguistic art and tool
of discourse implemented to persuade and influence through the rhetorical appeals:
ethos, pathos, and logos, and therefore, effect change in an audience. Linguistically,
rhetoric is identifiable as a means to an end, with a definite and exclusive bent toward
the human as being able to use it, to benefit from it, and to being inadvertently shaped it
through what Aristotle suggests are “the available means.” As a tool of discourse,
rhetoric is often thought of as being politically, socially, and economically situated,
through which rhetoric is, according to Foucault, “both the means of oppressing and the
means of resistance” (Mills, 2003). Because of its historic theoretical foundations and
practical applications in the uses of language and discourse, prior notions of rhetoric are
grounded mostly in theories of language and social construction and tend to discount
our material surroundings as fundamental to our existence, and as I will assert
throughout my project, to writing. In a deeper theorization of rhetoric as being, many
current rhetoric and writing studies scholars are interested in capturing what Rickert
(2013) calls the ambient nature of rhetoric, that is, that rhetoric is constituted by what’s
“lying around” in the environment made agential by an energy imbued in all bodies,
human and nonhuman.
A posthuman rhetoric presupposes what I call an affective rhetoricity imbued in
all forms of matter including the human (Kennedy, 1992; Davis, 2011; Rickert, 2013;
Hawhee, 2017). To explain, rhetoric is considered fundamental to interaction and
communication across all species and “must diffuse outward to include the material
environment, things (including the technological), our own embodiment, and a complex
understanding of ecological relationality as participating in rhetorical practices”
(Rickert, 2013, p. 3). Edbauer Rice (2005) suggests that affect is integral within
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rhetoricity and is indicative of the material signifiers that produce feeling and language.
Therefore, affective rhetoricity is defined by rhetoricity as inherent to interaction
between bodies, human and nonhuman, which presupposes affect—defined here as
what happens in the seemingly invisible spaces between bodies, human and nonhuman.
Powerful social events in which interactions between human action, political conditions,
and objects exemplify affective rhetoricity as a collective unfolding. These events are
necessarily characterized by each component of the event occurring in overlapping
tandem with the other components or conditions that arise from a host of other
interactions.
In the aftermath of the Stoneman-Douglas High School shootings in Parkland,
Florida, students were issued clear plastic backpacks in which to carry their belongings
and as a measure of safety. Among student complaints regarding the backpacks were
that their privacy had been violated and that state politicians accepted donations from
the National Rifle Association, all the while not cracking down on gun laws to prevent
these kinds of tragedies. The networked ecology of this rhetorical situation
demonstrates the impact of the rhetoric produced by students and communicated from
within the backpack. Students wrote messages to display on the front of their backpacks
about how they feel about carrying them, the political implications of such a mandate,
and the social ramifications of being forced to relinquish privacy. These clear backpacks
are agential in not only calling attention to a host of political and social issues, but what
matters for the students is what they have written with, about, in, because, and in spite
of the backpacks.
One student poignantly wrote: “This backpack is probably worth more than my
life,” calling attention to the seemingly invisible valuation of both humans and
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nonhumans. The attached $1.05 price tag refers to the total cost of what students allege
is the money accepted from the NRA by Florida Senator Marco Rubio, divided by the
total number of students in the state (“Parkland Students Slam Clear Backpacks,” 2018).
In conjunction with the backpack, the price tag further goads the response that while the
government supports protecting students by issuing these backpacks, the cost pales in
comparison to the financial backing of political interests by gun enthusiasts.
This is just one of innumerable examples
of how affective rhetoricity, which I
define in the next section, constitutes
and sustains the relationship between
bodies, both human and nonhuman.

Figure 2: Clear backpack with political message
Attention to the backpack’s rhetoricity—the backpack’s rhetorical being and agency—
illuminates the exigency for attending to the materials we live by, for, and with—
whether our relationships with those materials is productive or stifling, invigorating or
oppressing. The backpack embodies the rhetorical, affectual collision of events, bodies,
and language. It shows, precisely, how matter and affect work together in rhetorical
production.
Affective Rhetoricity
If we accept the precepts of posthuman ontology as a discipline, I propose that an
exploration of the relationship between affect and rhetoric can lead to a more robust
consideration of rhetoric as an underpinning to all human and nonhuman interaction.
The privileging of all bodies and materials, human and nonhuman, as a central tenet of
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affective rhetoricity, can help us understand and explain the role of all bodies in
producing affect which ultimately produces rhetoric. In considering that rhetoric does
not merely occur without cause or without causation or within a vacuum or without the
intra-action of other events, bodies, and materials, affective rhetoricity helps us
understand the enormity of what must occur in terms of events, communication, and
language in order to produce rhetoric. Both human and nonhuman bodies are affectively
rhetorical because they carry with them the potential and power to affect and be
affected. Affective rhetoricity is a way of understanding the capacity and potential of all
bodies to act as a form of reason and logic beyond linguistic and discursive strictures.
1) Affective rhetoricity is integral to producing agency among all forms of matter.
Affective rhetoricity extends agency, effectively displacing humans as the central
agential body in interactions. Affect is intangible and becoming, and agency is the
ability or capacity to act; therefore, agency is produced through a collection of
becomings and entanglements. The process of affect is reciprocal in that we affect
and are affected, like all other human and nonhuman bodies. The expression of
affect is different than the expression of emotion in that emotion is the material,
concrete, human bodily expression of affect; affect is not “mere feeling”
(Massumi, 2019). Characterizing affect as feeling, then, would qualify it as purely
human.
2) Affective rhetoricity is an inarticulable form of knowing that takes place beyond
the boundaries of language and traditional rhetoric and is characterized by body
logic. Affective rhetoricity is often invisible or hidden and the seeming
contradiction of this invisibility and forcefulness and therefore generally not
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considered part of rational thought or logic. Affect as a form of logic outside that
which is propagated by Western philosophy.
3) Affective rhetoricity is ontologically indeterminate, nebulous, and temporal. Our
knowing is dependent on that which is to come, that which is becoming—not that
which is already been done, which is already something we’ve acted upon,
labeled, named, ascribed, prescribed, setup, devised, constructed, written,
documented, digitized.
Affect in Rhetorical Studies
In finding myself trying to finish a dissertation in the middle of a pandemic, I
believe there may be no better time to write about the collisions and convergences of the
posthuman, rhetoric, and affect as a collective philosophical, ontological disposition.
There is, in fact, no better time or place in this dissertation to acknowledge the presence,
pervasiveness, or persistence of human and, specifically, American exceptionalism.
Perhaps being American is why I am just now arriving at this conclusion. Indeed, the
long history of American rhetoric would have us believe that we are unstoppable,
exhibiting strength beyond people in other countries, and simply bullet-proof; however,
the rhetoric has reinforced by the minute, with help from the 24-hour news cycle, that
nothing can stand in our way of supremacy over all others, human and nonhuman. The
pandemic revealed the always already displacement of human agency in that an
“invisible” virus has upended and consumed human lives at an extraordinary rate.
Because the virus cannot be conquered by sheer physical strength or by simply ignoring
it, we are able to recognize that we, as humans, are not who we thought we were. The
fact is, we have not ever been in control of life, rather, we share along with other bodies,
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human and nonhuman, a reality that is not unilaterally and independently governed by
humans. Moreover, the spread of a novel coronavirus as the central issue that can help
us to better understand who we are and what exactly our standing is as humans instead
of or beyond our longstanding, historic belief that we reign supreme over all forms of
matter from animals to viruses. The pandemic has also made clear that rhetoric and the
use of language to persuade is not ending, but rather, has become a central focus of daily
life. The virulent spread of information, disinformation, and conspiracies is yet another
reason to move away from language as something that can be deciphered through a
diagnostic: what does it mean/what did he say/etc. is no longer reliable for use as the
typical rhetorical lens we have so carefully and confidently gazed through to make sense
of words and their meanings. Not that it has lost any importance; rather, the time has
arrived for us to reckon with language and rhetoric to further understand the nuts and
bolts of our social construction and how and why we’ve come to this important juncture
as a society.
The use of rhetoric against the existence of the virus is also evidence of our fear
that our human standing is threatened, putting us on a perpetual, metaphorical,
emotional roller coaster. Language has reinforced our human exceptionalist tendencies;
it seems the more we doubt our human-privileged existence, the louder and more
adamant we contest the ideas that we could not possibly be crippled as a whole because
of what has been called the invisible enemy. This language we have clung to, listened to,
spoken, and chanted has a purpose: it has effectively convinced us that we can always
win, no matter the circumstances, the consequences, or the cost. A human
acknowledgement of the role of language and traditional concepts of rhetoric is yet
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another partner with whom we share and make meaning—it is not the primary source of
meaning or knowledge.
Affectual Acknowledgements
While the pandemic has afforded me a significant amount of free(er), privileged
time, it has also enabled me to better understand my own ideas for this dissertation.
Like many others all over the world, I have grappled with working from home because of
school closures, childcare conundrums, and pervasive sense of dread and anxiety which
blankets many of my days. These feelings of anxiousness indicate to me that there is
little else that matters than the virus and its effects on the whole of humanity, which is
also indicative, once again, of our displaced standing as omnipotent. And, in keeping
with the major thrust of this dissertation, the scholars of the discipline of rhetoric and
writing studies have an ethical obligation to incorporate/rely on/revise (once more) our
conception of rhetoric as epistemological to one that is ontological based on an
acknowledgement that 1) human agency is redistributed among, between, within all
human and nonhuman bodies, materials, and interactions thereby dismantling the
historical, material reign over all forms of matter, 2) language is insufficient for
understanding all of our material entanglements and is even damaging when we place
language as primary episteme above all other forms of knowing, many of which are
grounded/located within the affectual realm. Based on these tenets, rhetoric as a
concept must be expanded to fully embrace the theoretical assertions that rhetoric is a
“form of mental energy” (Kennedy, 1992), “ambient” (Rickert, 2013), “primordial”
(Davis, 2011), “ancient” (Hawhee, 2017), and “(meta)physical” (Edbauer, 2005). In an
effort to fully conceptualize rhetoric as ontological, I turn to relevant scholarship in the
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field of rhetoric and writing studies so that I can attempt to connect the dots from
ontology to rhetoric to affect to affective rhetoricity.
Energy as Rhetorical Vitality
While much of recent theoretical scholarship in rhetoric and writing studies takes
up the convergences between and among language as material and rhetoric as energy
and the material, there is perhaps no time like the present to explore the rhetorical,
providential contribution of nonhuman bodies as they coincide with human rhetorical
activity and practice, as language continues to take center stage in our traditional
understanding of rhetoric as it plays out in current digital and social media—further
cementing the presupposed, superior standing of humans in rhetorical production.
Hawhee (2017) introduces a purview of a rationality informed by the affectual energy
nonhuman animals contribute to human rhetorical situations and interactions. Hawhee
(2017) also brings vital attention to the role of the “rhetorical energy” (Kennedy, 1990)
of nonhuman animals and other bodies, events, and convergences, effectively displacing
the human as the locus of rhetorical control and, thereby, diminishing the historically
exceptional role of human language and communication. Hawhee (2017) suggests early
on in her work that in “moving past the representational role of animals,” we can begin
to accept their always already existing role as “partners in feeling”—producing rhetoric
beyond the clever uses of language. The relationship between humans and nonhuman
animals can help us more fully appreciate the potential for understanding the ways that
we owe our humanness, in great part, to that which we act in, around, on, because of,
and in spite of. Hawhee (2017) argues in support of the significant contribution of
nonhuman animals in rhetorical situations, texts, and events, signaling to modern
rhetorical scholars that the discipline has turned more convincingly toward the vitality
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and rhetorical power of materiality and must therefore be considered in the theory and
practice of rhetoric.
Drawing on Heidegger’s theoretical assertions that being is inseparable from the
world it inhabits, Rickert (2013) suggests that “the worldliness of being situated is the
means by which we are attuned…” and therefore “transforms the locus of (human)
agency” (p. 13). Through this revisioning of agency, Rickert (2013) describes affect as
central, which “emerges as activity both occasioned and conditioned by surrounding
lands, communities, and forces (p. 15). Rickert expounds on the posthuman notion that
our agential encounters are not meant for domain over these interactions; rather, these
engagements can be thought of as practice, as theoretically advanced by Boyle (2020).
Affect and, therefore, knowing is generated by these inter/intra-actions that form the
nebulousness and shape of our existence. Perhaps most importantly, Rickert (2013)
makes the case for an expanded view of agency that encompasses our physical
environment and “conveys our affective investment and emplacement within an
environs.” Rickert’s (2013) concept of ambience is evidence of “the dispersal and
diffusion of agency.” The nonhuman material dimensions as agential is central, albeit
contrary, to traditional humanistic understanding of rhetoric.
Rickert (2013) ultimately defines rhetoric as an “embodied and embedded
practice…environmentally situated…redolent of a world that affects us, that persuades
us prior to symbolicity” (p. 34). With that, we are acting in a world which fails to value
that prior rhetoricity, the ‘pre-existing condition” that is the human condition,
effectively negating our humanness in favor of that which can be easily see, better
explained, rationalized; rather, human/social symbolicity is valuing of itself, for it is
imagined, created, realized, materialized by humans and their collective need to
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organize and connect the dots based on what they see, hear, speak, act, and observe.
Therein lies the eternal, existential match between rhetoric and reality, made crystal
clear by the pandemic’s illumination of public health, widening economic and social
disparities, and exploited by rhetoric in the form of language, effectively politicized. This
collective crisis situation we humans find ourselves in showcases a rhetoric
characterized by “many complexly interacting agents dynamically attuned and exposed
to one another, an attunement that may be as competitive as long as it maintains an
ecological relation or connectedness to the world round-about…a rhetoric dispersed,
embodied, and embedded, one no longer mired in subjectivism and all the
epistemological and ethical problems that ensue therefrom” (p. 34).
Davis (2011) draws on Kennedy’s (1992) controversial assertion that “rhetoric…is
a natural phenomenon: the potential for it exists in all life forms that can give signals,”
further affirming the role of rhetoric in a transformation/transforms into a rhetoricity
informed by affect as it enables/provides the capacity for rhetorically to capture the
rhetorical dimensions found in all forms of matter, in agreement/consistent with that
what Davis (2011) suggest that corporality, the inhabitance of a body in any case, gives
way to “affectability or persuadability” (p. 89). Yet, “the body is not a discrete
phenomenological entity” (p. 90). Davis (2011) characterizes and defines rhetoric as “an
underivable obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible relationality” (p. 89).
She provides, perhaps, the most accurate description of rhetoric as rhetoricity,
suggesting “in the beginning was rhetoric, neither as genetic attribute nor as art or
science but as an underivable provocation, an imperative to respond,” casting serious
doubt on prior definitions of rhetoric that are more concrete and less inclusive, further
hinting that rhetoric has far less to do with language and human action/interaction.
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Boyle (2018) defines rhetoric as “a practice that exercises serial encounters within
ecologies to inform bodies … [and] can be understood as the operation that reincorporates bodies by mediating how those different registers relate…[furthermore],
practice comprises an ecology that includes but is irreducible to the human as such” (p.
27).
There is, perhaps, no better time to think and write about the power of traditional
notions of rhetoric as entrenched in language—the ways language is used to align,
divide, distort, and unite humans. From the outset of the pandemic, human political
rhetoric has solidly shaped our human minds at this juncture. Clearly, naysayers of
science have proliferated and have affected human behavior to such an extent that
people have refused to follow public health orders. This disregard for science reveals our
humanness and our basest desires for stability and certainty. Our social constructions
have provided this, but only falsely. Because of the tangibility, of our human structures,
we are comforted and therefore safe in what we have built. The pandemic has disrupted
this false sense of certainty in the human, decidedly American, ability to conquer
whatever lies in their way. At the time of this writing, we are waiting for distribution of a
vaccine for which we don’t know long it will take to inoculate the human population, nor
how long the vaccine will be efficacious in the human body. Likewise, we do not know
how many people will actually take the vaccine. These are all issues of reaction—the
corporeal human body and its action—and are therefore subject to the limits of
humanity as we have historically and traditionally conceived as human.
Theories of Affect
Affect, by its nature, is tenuous and cannot be pinned down by language, making
it an ideal interdisciplinary match for rethinking rhetoric as a concept that has
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historically been viewed AS a stable object—a tool through which language can be
formed and shaped for human motive. Central to any definition of affect is that its
power is what it keeps it above the power constructed between physical bodies through
social construction, which is theoretically useful in conjoining rhetoric and affect as a
tool, broadening the definition of rhetoric beyond the social and material into
something more whole, finite, and yet more complex (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010).
The purpose of integrating affect into the discipline of rhetoric and writing
studies for the purposes of thinking ontologically about how we think about the teaching
of writing which stands in direct opposition to the “domination of epistemology …
theories of what knowledge is and does” (Grosz, 2018, p. 2) and in philosophical favor of
an ontology informed by a fundamental acknowledgment of the uncertainty of knowing.
However, applying affect to rhetoric as a way of more broadly accounting for that which
shapes human thinking, writing, and action—beyond “things and their knowable,
determinable relations” (Grosz, 2018, p. 4). In other words, this points to the idea that
we continue to want to latch on to ways of being that are rooted in what we perceive as
rational and stable to make human life easier to deal with. The nebulous nature of the
discipline of rhetoric and writing studies is a testament to the value of privileging of
ontology as a primary way of knowing—one that less informed and propagated by
language—specifically one that must make sense of “human” activities like the practice
and teaching of writing. What does it mean to accept and enact an ontology that both
acknowledges that there are things we don’t know “outside and beyond what our current
epistemologies allow us to understand” (Grosz, 2018, p. 3) AND account for what is,
namely the human and nonhuman bodies and materials we work with and around in the
everyday? How is a reconciliation of the “known” and unknown even possible, and what
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does that mean within the tenuous confines of a discipline that affords its scholars and
practitioners the space to question what, how, and why we know what we do? These
questions guide my ethical inquiry into not only how and why we do/should act, but
how we teach an understanding of the world through the study of rhetoric and practice
of writing.
Incorporeality as Vitally Affective
Grosz (2018) proposes that “ontologies have ethical and political—as well as
aesthetic and cultural—resonances that they provide limits and obstacles, an outside, to
epistemological frameworks” (p. 3). It is getting down to the fundamental of what
matters, of that which is not made easily accessible to us that informs an ethical
integration of affect into and understanding, practice, and teaching of rhetoric. While
theories of rhetoric have considered numerous configurations or relationships between
rhetoric and philosophy (Davis and Boyle), rhetoric and composition (Berlin and Scott),
rhetoric and pedagogy (Freire and Bartholomae), rhetoric and power imbued in
gendered interactions and institutions (Foucault, Irigaray, Bourdieu), incorporating
affect as fundamental to rhetoric enables a deeper conceptual robustness closely aligned
with rhetorical material theorists exploring the ambient nature of rhetoric (Rickert), the
vibrancy and agency of matter (Bennett and Gries), and the ontological disposition
required to think about the rhetorical becoming of all forms of matter (Barad and
Barnett & Boyle). Much of the theoretical exploration I have undertaken began outside
the disciplinary canon and, I have come to understand and believe that rhetoric, and
consequently writing studies, must look beyond the standard body of rhetorical
knowledge that has historically comprised our traditional conceptualization of rhetoric.
In fact, this is the metaphor for the ontological academic crisis I find myself in. My
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primary focus as a scholar of rhetoric and writing is to locate what lies beyond the
body—human and nonhuman—to reveal that that which we can see and discern does not
capture the entirety of what matters. The scholarly work in affect in rhetorical studies
has laid the groundwork for thinking more intentionally about the relationships
between humans and nonhumans. Similarly, the concept of the posthuman significantly
alters our human relationship with language and our understanding of our historically
superior position among all bodies.
Grosz (2018) offers an acute philosophical lens useful for understanding rhetoric
as inherently and vitally affective, focusing on what she calls the incorporeal—that which
lies beyond the body, but which is constituted by the human or nonhuman body:
the incorporeal conditions of corporeality, the excesses beyond and
within corporeality that frame, orient, and direct material things and
processes, and especially living things and the biological processes they
require, so that they occupy space and time, have possible meanings and
directions that exceed their corporeality … an extramaterialism … the
inherence of ideality, conceptuality, meaning, or orientation that persists
in relation to and within materiality as its immaterial or incorporeal
conditions. (p. 5)
In exploring the role of the immaterial as a vital dimension of rhetoric, the integration of
affect and rhetoric produces a concept of “how we think materiality and ideality together
remains central” (Grosz, 2018, p. 6). In this case, it is the centrality of extramaterial,
affectual tendencies and interactions that constitute rhetoric, bodies, and matter in all
its forms.
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When bodies and matter converge, affect is produced. The interaction is thus
layered with everything that comes into that interaction, creating a complexity that is,
indeed, indescribable through language and discourse. The invisible interactions that
comprise the space between, among, and beyond bodies, objects, and the multiplicity of
other materials that are infinitely being acted on, between, and in conjunction with/in
relation to other bodies. It is in the invisibility of this space that I locate what I
conceptualize as affective rhetoricity. The space, itself, is rhetorical because it is
inherently affective, possessing the capacity to affect and be affected (Spinoza). This
affective space that produces the rhetoric that exists but cannot be ascribed through
language and discourse—it circumvents language--but informs the affective nature of
materials and bodies and their interactions. For example, the 70-year-old school
building I currently teach will be razed and a new one constructed over the space
previously occupied by the old building. What does it mean for things to become
immaterial and treated as though they never existed? That the cracks in the ceiling and
the dirty blinds never existed, that they didn’t have a real impact on how students were
affected by the condition and presence of these objects? In making the case for
acknowledging how the material environment is relevant to affect, and therefore,
relevant to what and how rhetoric is produced by affect, would it not be reasonable to
assume that a run-down school would have a different impact on students than a brandnew facility? What does it mean to archive the memory of an object, especially as
memories are primarily affective and either transport us or create a place for us to
reside? One response to the discordant views between a flattening of bodies to account
more broadly for the entirety of human and nonhuman interaction and the risk of
simultaneously flattening social identity that this question refers to is to consider the
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structures that have been built on top of sacred spaces, as in the case of the 365 Catholic
churches that have been erected over ancient pyramids in Cholula, Mexico, explicitly
revealing the ways in which human identity is at risk for being squashed by an objectoriented ontology. Affective rhetoricity offers a way to explain and account for these
human decisions and actions which have a profound impact on individual and collective
human identity.
Meaning is often reduced to that which we can name, and affect is largely ignored
through language. In turn, language fails to account for the very real, albeit immaterial
dimensions of bodily existence by virtue of the fact that bodily, objective existence is
constituted by and in direct relation with that which is incorporeal and subjective—
inherently difficult to pin down and articulate. Grosz (2018) explains an incorporeality
as an ontological departure from the modern Western philosophy cemented by
Descartes and “committed to the logical and ontological separation of mind from body
or the material from the ideal.” It is this ontological shift that I explore which
encourages a merge between affect and rhetoric because it allows a fluidity in how we
can conceptualize rhetoric as ephemeral, existing energy, rather than a set of static tools
derived from language and social construction.
Contours of Affect
A rhetorical approach to affect and in conjoining rhetoric and affect together,
“differs from those (theories) that tend toward a more direct analysis of signs and
discourses, rights and rationales, within what is often at best a clash of given
frameworks” (Bertelsen & Murphie, 2010, p. 139). The character of affect is such that it
is so highly contextualized through, in, around, beyond, between, among various bodies,
human and nonhuman, that it is not possible to point directly at any one thing, rather,
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these affectual relationships cannot be easily analyzed, unpacked, diagnosed, labeled,
named, etc. because if they can, then it doesn’t make sense to continue propagating a
concept/theory/practice that does nothing but rearticulate what we already know
through our own construction. Seigworth and Gregg (2010) define affect as “persistent
proof of a body’s never less than ongoing immersion in and among the world’s
obstinacies and rhythms, its refusals as much as its invitations” (p. 1). The
communication of signs, symbols, and words is already well-established and offers a
clear analytical path in finding out why things are as they are, why things are done as
they are done. The nebulousness of affect cannot be pinned down adequately with
language and is therefore worth considering what matters in the absence of language,
especially when it is most nearly inarticulable. Affective communication between bodies,
human and nonhuman, is a “transduction (transformation) of forces rather than a
transmission of signs” and is defined by “resonances that circulate about, between, and
sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very passages or variations between
these intensities and resonances themselves” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p.1). This
definition is most important to this project in which I advocate for creating a larger
space in rhetoric for affect as a central, yet ephemeral way of knowing, affect is
characterized as a form of knowing through means beyond human consciousness,
reason, and logic; rather, affect assumes its own logic (Guattari, 1995, as summarized in
Bertelsen & Murphie, 2010, p. 138).
Affect is a relational composition of material, bodily experiences that are
“synonymous with force or forces of encounter ... [which] transpires within and across
the subtlest of shuttling intensities: all the miniscule or molecular events of the
unnoticed” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 2). In this regard, affect can be viewed as the
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(invisible) stitching that holds together the pieces in a complicated, patterned quilt.
Affect is “directly relational” meaning that it exists between that which affects and
that which is affected (Massumi, 2015). Language is typically given or assigned (another
human quality) to that which we can see or explain but is insufficient for understanding
and ascribing the knowing on which we can base our lives and decisions. Highmore
(2010) defines the contours of affect as being able to “give you away” through “the
telltale heart...clammy hands; the note of anger in your voice; the sparkle of glee in their
eyes” (p. 118). These affectual dimensions of the body and their effects are
communicated to others about how we are in the most specific sense of the word. It
matters so little about who we say we are. It matters how we feel because it tells us “who
we really are, or what you really are...found in the pumping of your blood, the quantity
and quality of your perspiration, the breathless anticipation in your throat, the way you
can’t stop yourself from grinning, the glassy sheen of your eyes” (p. 118). Affect
reattunes humans toward looking beyond being human as a stable existentiality and
allows us to develop the foresight to understand how affect is produced in a layered
response in concert with rhetoric through bodily interactions between humans and
nonhumans.
Highmore (2010) definitively characterizes affect as one’s “personal polygraph
machine,” giving credence to the body’s ability to discern the minutiae of objects,
people, materials, events, and many other human and nonhuman bodies and affects (p.
118). The body doesn’t lie and entrusting one’s thoughts to any one thing anything or
anyone else is not only unnatural, but also a mistake. But, hitching affect to only one of
these human and nonhuman bodies is also not sensible. Indeed, “the sticky
entanglements of substances and feelings, of matter and affect are central to our contact
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with the world” (Highmore, 2010, p. 119). In the same way that bodies are not discrete
entities, neither is affect a thing to be ascribed by or through language but is wholly
material to how and what we experience as humans. Seigworth and Gregg (2010) pose
the question: “how to begin when, after all, there is no pure or somehow originary state
for affect?” My questioned response to their question lies in the theoretical exploration
regarding posthumanism, rhetoric, and affect I take up in this dissertation: what is in
the invisible spaces between material bodies? How do we know what we know when
nothing concrete can be pointed to as the source of knowledge?
Affective Presence
At different points during this project, I have thought a lot about the fact that
some people would suggest that an in-between, affective presence is constitutive of God,
as many people believe that God is omnipresent. Belief in God is, indeed, one way of
knowing—integrated as one aspect of knowing into a full way of knowing and being for
many people. What I refer to regarding affect is an acknowledgement of energy imbued
in all bodies, materials, and their interactions. If God is removed from the equation as
the ONLY (which is what people of the strongest faith suggest) ever-present, affective
invisibility, then there must be something else at play—the fundamental material
interactions that had to occur to bring humanity into being. The lens through which
belief in God directs our thoughts and actions is another ontological disposition toward
being and knowing. So, what I argue for here is an ontology in which God is also part of
the “flattened” rhetorical network of all bodies, concepts, materials—possessing the
capacity to act and be acted upon. I realize this sounds somewhat atheistic. On some
level, I think one of the strands of this project is an unconscious, unintentional
continuation of my long-time exploration of whether God exists, and if so, what role
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does God play in shaping our existence or explaining what we are all doing here? My
personal belief in God waned significantly before I entered college. I had become
disenchanted with church and questioned human allegiance and blind faith in the
Bible—words written long ago, in a particular context, and stitched together by humans
in a more or less “logical” order. Perhaps that’s where my fascination and philosophical
problem with language began. I felt I couldn’t ignore or explain the bad in the world
through God. I felt—still feel—that mere belief is insufficient to consider the entirety of
who we are as humans and all that being human entails.
We do not have knowledge based only on that which is materially tangible, and
yet, our social construction as posited by rhetoric as a discipline has informed how we
think of ourselves and how we think about and use words and objects in our everyday
lives to shape our human trajectory. Inevitably, this intense, unrelenting focus on the
body (human and nonhuman) has caused us to become more entrenched in the visible
materiality of life, voraciously seeking knowledge and meaning, all the while ignoring
and fearing the nothing that makes the everything possible, as Heidegger suggests. In a
turn toward theories of affect to explain the “in-between-ness” that constitutes the
invisibility of what matters between matter, affect is foremost defined as
an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state
of relation as well as the passage (and the duration of passage) of forces or
intensities...it is the name we give to those forces—visceral forces beneath,
alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting
beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought
and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely
registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by
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the world’s apparent intractability. Indeed, affect is persistent proof of a body’s
never less than ongoing immersion in and among the world’s obstinacies and
rhythms, its refusals as much as its invitations. (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p.1)
To expand on the invisible spaces that comprise what matters beyond the material
bodies we act in and upon, affect is “found in those intensities that pass body to body
(human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise” (Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p. 1). The
body’s capacity to affect and be affected seems to be the link between how we might
consider a reconceptualization of the human as posthuman: affective capacity
contributes to the displacement of human agency and extends it to all objects and bodies
in the environment and are thereby agential, as exhibited in the backpack example:
human language and objects converge to create temporal meaning, widening the scope
of agency to objects. The backpack with the specific words of students could only take
place because of the events that occur surrounding the distribution of the backpacks in
response to the shooting.
Affective Capacity
Affect is representative of the “imminent” capacity for the body, human and
nonhuman, to process the interactional invisibilities of the everyday, characterized by
the “vaporous evanescences of the incorporeal (events, atmospheres, feeling-tones)”
Affect is further characterized by “a body’s belonging to a world of encounters or; a
world’s belonging to a body of encounters but also, in non-belonging, through all those
far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibilities…in this ever-gathering
accretion of force-relations (or, conversely, in the peeling or wearing away of such
sedimentations) lie the real powers of affect, affect as potential: a body’s capacity to
affect and be affected,” and in this lies a strong parallel with rhetoric. Affect speaks to
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the networked connections of all bodies, human and nonhuman, as well as to the way we
come to know, how we are not only shaped by the stuff of our environment and can
point to the concreteness that comprises that knowledge and consequent disposition,
but how there are other, invisibilities that lie silently beyond, within, and between
bodies that impel bodies to act, as Freud suggested (1966 as paraphrased in Seigworth &
Gregg, 2010). Acknowledging affect as a vital rhetorical partner is a freedom away from
the social construction of language and knowledge—in effect, the script by which we are
taught to follow, essentially leaving no room for more originary modes and methods of
thought and delivery.
Seigworth and Gregg (2010) quote Spinoza: “no one has yet determined what the
body can do,” and in this regard, the body is an embodied locus of affect, “belonging to a
world of encounters or, a world’s belonging to a body of encounters but also, in nonbelonging, through all those far sadder (de)compositions of mutual in-compossibilities”
(p. 2). We know about the body only insofar as we can tangibly interact with the body
and its processes, even knowing a great deal of minutiaed processes invisible without
the tools of technology. We do not, however, know about the affectual forces that
underpin action, reaction, interaction and therefore this is what we just don’t know,
can’t predict, and can’t elucidate because we. do. not. know. Without running the risk of
saying that there is some greater, higher power guiding our human action, I do think
this energy, this rhetorical, affectual energy, is always, inherently at play within, beyond,
around, and through us, providing/making way for the connections that link all forms of
matter. Affect, then, is that which cannot be attributed to the visible concreteness of
bodies, human and nonhuman; rather, it matters in the way of force, in the ways of the
immaterial which matter more to us than what we think matters.
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In chapter 3, I have revisited rhetoric through the posthuman concept of affective
rhetoricity—that is, in stripping away the trappings of our social construction to expose
the human as free from its previously held concepts of itself. We can view our ability and
capacity to use language as central to our collective, colossal deception of ourselves as
humans; we have relied solely on language to tighten our grip on who we demand to be
and determine who others should be. In Chapter 4, I trace and synthesize fundamental
scholarly assertions of rhetoric as both epistemic and ontological with the discipline of
rhetoric and writing studies before moving into a deep dive into some of the most recent
scholarship in the discipline that aligns with theories of the posthuman and affect as
they pertain to theories and practices in rhetoric and writing studies.
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Chapter 4: Acknowledging Affective Rhetoricity
My pursuit in questioning what we teach in rhetoric and writing courses have
taken me down academic roads that extend far beyond the discipline of rhetoric and
writing studies, yet I recognize that grounding these theoretical assertions in practice is
necessary as an instructor of rhetoric and writing. Based on my professional experiences
working with students in both high school and college classrooms as well as my on
theoretical research, I argue that developing a disposition and pedagogical methods
toward writing through an understanding of affective rhetoricity will help instructors of
rhetoric and writing refine their ethical responsibilities by enacting and promoting
instructional practices that work to dissolve traditional boundaries and power dynamics
both between students and instructors as well as between, among, and in spite of human
and nonhuman interactions. This pedagogical disposition makes relationships matter
between human and nonhuman, and ultimately, revisions writing as an ethical act by
materially acknowledging everything from environmental conditions—especially as
exemplified in those conditions contributing to global climate change—to academic texts
that make writing possible. A responsibility lies within our pedagogical approaches in
the rhetoric and writing classroom as one defined by an intentional inclusion and
acknowledgement of those objects, events, texts, and conditions, imbued with affective
rhetoricity, that create more meaningful occasions for writing and rhetorical production.
In essence, this fuller ontological disposition gives inquiry and dialogue different anchor
points, and potentially, opens spaces for innovation and better solutions to intractable
issues.
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Background of Rhetoric as Epistemic and Ontological
Historically considered the art of persuasion through what Aristotle calls the
“available means,” the definition and purpose of rhetoric has endured numerous
rearticulations. It has long been considered a central tool of language and argument, a
necessary component of style in written and oral composition, and nearly synonymous
with oratory and speech—from Enheduanna to Martin Luther King, Jr. Most recently
and since the formation of the academic discipline of rhetoric and writing studies,
however, through the social and linguistic philosophical turns in the 20th century,
rhetoric has assumed a philosophical role in the treatment of language and knowledge,
beginning with Scott (1967).
Constituted by knowledge through language and discourse and what Scott (1967)
calls “cooperative critical inquiry,” rhetoric is epistemic—a way of knowing the world in
which there is “no possibility in matters relevant to human interaction to determine
truth in an a priori way.” Furthermore, it is philosophically fundamental to the
discipline of rhetoric and writing studies that “truth is not prior and immutable, but is
contingent,’ and that rhetoric “may be viewed not as a matter of giving effectiveness to
the truth, but of creating truth” (Scott, 1967). By defining rhetoric as epistemic, it is
important not to conceptualize it as a pursuit of knowledge, but as an onto-epistemology
directed at understanding that which is unfixed, unstable, and uncertain, as opposed to
that which seems stable through the language and rhetoric we have used to assign, label,
categorize. Scott’s (1967) assertion of the epistemological nature of rhetoric ultimately
informs an ontology that is positioned openly toward the temporality and contingency of
matter: a state of being is, inherently, a state of becoming. An understanding of rhetoric
as epistemic illuminates the ways in which “linguistic structures ... shape or determine
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our understanding of the world, believing that the subject and predicate structure of
language reflects a prior ontological reality of substance and attribute,” (Barad, 2003)
which has inevitably articulated a disposition toward language as the primary way of
knowing. I argue here, as in other places in this dissertation, that humans cannot
continue to rely upon language as the sole producer of knowledge or evidence of our
human exceptionalism.
Scott (1967) suggested that in viewing rhetoric as epistemic, there lies a set of
ethical implications that have to do with our disposition toward others which is
foregrounded by language. Embracing the uncertainty of life in spite of the instability of
language, and to act in accordance with uncertainty requires a willingness to “respect
the integrity of the expression and action of others” (Scott, 1967, p. 16). If all we know is
through rhetoric, and consequently, language, and each of these can only provide
contingent truths, then how can we, in good conscience, dismiss or measure others
based on their language or beliefs according to a fixed standard that has been devised
outside of their experiences? By asserting that truth is unfixed, for example, it is not
possible to suggest that one person or group is superior to another because there is no
basis or foundation for it. While we might profess that we are tolerant, our actions and
policies reveal otherwise, we continue to other people through enforcing and
legitimizing language as the only way of knowing, as our actions simply do not match
our words. Within the ethical implications that rhetoric is epistemic, one must
“recognize the conflicts of the circumstances that he is in, maximizing the potential good
and accepting responsibility for the inevitable harm” (Scott, 1967, p. 17). For Scott
(1967), assuming responsibility for one’s actions is crucial in reconciling the past, not
only for oneself, but for all people. In other words, by acknowledging that truth is
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created temporally, we can acknowledge the significance and weight of all actions for all
time, not just in the present, humanist perspective. By acknowledging that our acts are
not predetermined, we acknowledge that history is not merely something that
happened, but that people made conscious and unconscious decisions for specific
outcomes as determined by their realities, which again, were shaped by the language
and rhetoric of the time. By concretizing language into writing, we tend to perceive that
the ideas and knowledge generated in that writing are fixed and stable, but “the
phenomenon of expression cannot be reduced to logos; it is both more fundamental and
more general ... it is by acting and in action that he is enabled to know” (Thevenaz as
qtd. in Scott, 1967, p. 15). Rhetoric, then, is not just about saying the right thing; it’s
about doing the right thing. Furthermore, by thinking of rhetoric only as an
epistemological pursuit, we continue to rely on language to tell us what we know, even
though the historically privileged ways of knowing are fundamentally informed by
language. How, then, can we use language to ascribe meaning to that which is
contingent? If we believe that language is slippery, and we believe that truth is
contingent and temporally shaped by rhetoric, then we must believe that ethical action
grounded in kairos, defined by opportunity and timeliness, is not only possible, but
necessary; humans must be willing to act quickly to meet the moment responsibly.
Traditionally, composition studies have “largely relied on the rhetorical canon
and social construction as central explanatory systems of writing and communication ...
[which are] not adventurous enough to match the creative complexities of our time”
(Micciche, 2014, p. 497). Within posthuman and new materialist discourses currently
expanding the disciplinary boundaries in rhetoric and writing studies, theorists in these
areas generally posit that “language has been granted too much power” (Barad, 2003, p.
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801). Probably the most significant implication for Scott’s (1967) assertion that rhetoric
is epistemic is the change in the relationship between the knower and the known which
fundamentally underscores the temporality of rhetoric and language and reality as
constituted by rhetoric.
Temporality of Rhetoric and Language
While we have empowered language to provide us with truth, by embracing that
rhetoric is epistemic, truth is but temporarily revealed through language, and therefore,
language is temporary and contingent. Lotier (2016) suggests that invention as
theorized in composition studies is constituted by this indeterminacy and questions the
attempted “terminological clarity” to describe postprocess theory and pedagogy, a
theory in composition studies that acknowledges that writing is not merely an activity
located in a classroom and recognizes that “teaching writing is basically teaching
rhetorical sensitivity and hermeneutic guessing through a large number of literate
activities” (Kalan, 2014, p. 7). Its definitions and consequent ascribed meanings, along
with tracing newer conceptions of invention indicate that “defining postprocess
precisely may not be as crucial as one might imagine.” He asserts that the “polysemic
nature” of postprocess is an “integral component of the theory itself,” and that by trying
to pin down definitions within this theory that is, in and of itself, defined by a “linguistic
indeterminacy,” we do not attend to “postprocess theory’s pedagogical implications”
(Lotier, 2016, p. 362). The fluid ambiguity by which postprocess is defined is analogous
to the ontological turn in the field that is characterized by a consideration for a reality
that remains unfixed, and therefore, unstable, even though the role of language has been
to set reality according to those who have the ability to use the dominant language
effectively and persuasively. What matters most in Lotier (2016) regarding Scott (1967),
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is that he marks a point in time in which postprocess began to take shape in the form of
what he calls “externalization” of the mind, as invention and “no cognitive action can
occur without the contribution of human or nonhuman others, including languages and
various technological artifacts” (p. 362).
Affective Collision. As I discuss in Chapter 3, affective rhetoricity is
characterized by a collision of language, material, and the immaterial embodied in this
image in which the COVID-19 pandemic and the public health measure of wearing a face
covering or mask collided with Black Lives Matter
protests in the summer of 2020 that ensued
because of George Floyd’s murder at the hands of
police. His murder was immediately and effectively
representative of the social brutality black
Americans have been and continue to be subject to
in a system that zeroes in on one aspect of human
Figure 3: Woman in mask during protest
bodies—skin color—to diminish, categorize, and normalize subjugation and racism.
Hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered all over the world amid and despite the
pandemic, donning masks to protect their health and those around them, and many
people wrote “I can’t breathe” or as shown in this image, “Please, I can’t breathe,”
restating the words of George Floyd and other black Americans who had been killed by
police through restricted breathing. The irony, of course, is that wearing a mask has the
potential to slightly impede normal breathing—an early argument against masks by
those on the far right of the American political spectrum—however, the surface of the
mask offered yet an additional space for protest and one marked by an
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acknowledgement that the socio-political nature of the masks offered a silent protest
against those who refused to wear them, in spite of the public health advisory that
wearing a mask inhibits the spread of COVID-19. Without the convergence of the
pandemic and Black Lives Matter protest, this meaning making could not have
occurred. The mask and writing embody an affective rhetoricity discerned by
temporality, immediacy, and fluidity.
Reality as Constituted by Rhetoric
The temporality of rhetoric and language shapes a fluid reality that is unfixed—
again, as shown in the protest mask. Furthermore, realities are shaped and reshaped
continuously because of the fluidity and uncertainty of things and language. In his
statement that “what is true for that man does not exist prior to but in the working out
of its own expression,” Scott (1967) suggests that everyone has a separate reality and set
of truths independent of all others, but he does not discuss the ways that those realities
are shaped beyond rhetoric. For Lotier (2016), the invention that takes place is
representative of and shaped by that which we are surrounded and is not constituted by
that something that resides only in the mind. The internalism Lotier (2016) refers to
which has defined the process of invention in composition reinforces the duality of the
body and the mind in such a way that we have not clearly been able to conceptualize that
the mind and body work in tandem, particularly when we are talking about invention
and ways of knowing. If we are only to look within, we see only that which we have been
exposed to and surrounded by. If we look outward ontologically, we can observe not
only what we do not know, but that which is unfamiliar and unstable, even though it has
always already been there.
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Relationship Between the Knower and the Known
Lotier (2016) illuminates the relationship between things and cognition in
describing “how-externalism” by suggesting that “environmental elements drive
cognitive processes, such that if those elements were to be removed, the cognitive
process would deteriorate” (p. 368). Our realities, then, are shaped by that which are
surrounded, even as the “mind is located less and less in the head,” and the influence of
our material environments is realized (p. 369). By understanding that cognition is not
only that which can be memorized or recorded and stored in the mind, it becomes
clearer that cognition is heavily dependent on the external, which ultimately informs our
thinking; however, it is precisely this thinking that generates an ontological perspective
in knowing, rather than one that is solely based on language and rhetoric as a way of
knowing. The entire function of language, therefore, is imperfect and ill-equipped to
provide meaning to that which cannot be pinned down, as much as we want to believe
otherwise. The relationship between the knower and the known is further blurred by a
posthumanist perspective that suggests “cognition as a necessarily plural act (or
response, or interaction), accomplished by an indefinite number of human and
nonhuman actors that have become localized and functional in collaborative effort”
(Lotier, 2016, p. 373). Even by suggesting that one is a knower sets up a position toward
knowledge that privileges humans and de-privileges that which constitutes the mind
and is also constitutive of the mind: matter in all forms.
What has always materially existed is what is relevant and what matters to life.
The perceived abstraction and privileging of language as conceptualized within the
discourses of posthumanism and new materialism is directly tied to the ontological turn
toward that which is characterized by an embrace of uncertainty that “require(s) us to
75

temper that possibility [of absolute knowledge] with the materially situated emergence
(presence) of opportunities (randomness)” (Brooke, 2000). College composition has
long been guided by a belief, both institutional and disciplinary, that our primary
responsibility is to teach writing as something that is done merely to fulfill a purpose, to
appease an audience, or to measure ourselves against an abstract standard constructed
by language. However, when writing, as externalized thinking, is viewed as a practice
without the intention of meeting a particular end, then writing can be seen as a way to
help students engage in the world through heightening their awareness of their
relationships and dependence on materials as constituting who we are. Rather than
reinforcing our separation and superiority from “things, places, people, and all sorts of
others,” Boyle (2016) suggests a model of writing instruction he calls posthuman
practice which can be conceptualized as “critical reflection ... [in] an ongoing series of
mediated encounters…[through] critical awareness that unfolds through repeated
material perceptions…in an age of constant connections to digital media and networks”
(p. 534). For example, the role of reflection in composition classrooms is rooted in the
notion of “deliberate practice,” a term associated with Gladwell’s 10,000-hour rule
(Boyle, 2016, p. 535). In other words, if a writer puts in the time through various
reflective writing activities, he or she will become an expert writer; however, he asserts
that this practice “hone(s) a knower-known relationship to a variety of objects” (Boyle,
2016, p. 536). In order for reflection to occur, we must be willing to continue thinking
about ourselves as disembodied from what can be known, instead of thinking as the
human as both a conduit for knowing as well as an equal rhetorical partner with all
other bodies, human and nonhuman. Posthuman thinking, therefore, is characterized
by developing a relational awareness that accounts for the human as being in a world
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that recognizes the material significance between people, objects, events, and many
others. Boyle (2016) cites Cooper as she suggests “writing is...responding to the
world...[in] an embodied interaction with other beings and our environments” (p. 538).
By placing ourselves at the forefront in which humans matter most, we have
inadvertently prioritized how we are affected by the world. There’s a certain reciprocity
built into that in which the world we have created returns to us what we have
constructed; however, Micciche (2014) suggests that we have consequently limited
“what counts as the social by foregrounding the constructed nature of texts, objects,
activities, and bodies with little attention to how such constructions interact with
natural systems, biology, animals, and other forms of matter” (p. 488). By
acknowledging the external, we open our minds to that which shapes our realities and
our truths, however contingent. Furthermore, by understanding what we know and how
we come to know is determinate of the way we approach life in all forms, paving the way
for deeper ethical considerations for how we conduct ourselves in relation to others,
human and nonhuman, and in teaching rhetoric and writing.
Boyle’s Posthuman Practice
Using Casey Boyle’s (2018) theory of posthuman practice, I argue that in
conjunction with my own theoretical assertions, that rhetoric and writing instruction
must transform to reflect the rhetorical dimensions and ethical demands of responding.
In cadence with my assertion that rhetoric is made possible by an ongoing affective
rhetoricity produced by human and nonhuman interaction, Boyle’s (2018) notion of
practice draws humans further toward an entanglement they are already enmeshed in,
not merely examining material entanglement from a distance. What Boyle (2018) calls
posthuman practice is evolved from rhetoric’s “current habit of humanist, reflective
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practice” (p. 34). Posthuman practice challenges the historical tradition of reflective
writing in rhetoric and composition courses and their accompanying textbooks, citing
the popularity of metacognition (thinking about thinking), further nestling humans into
the comfort of their own minds, even though the mind is totally externalized (Lotier,
2016). Aligned with my own argument, the posthuman is conceptualized as
interconnected, ecological, and capacious—beyond the boundaries of traditional
discourse and language. Posthuman practice for Boyle (2018) is primarily characterized
by a consideration for an “individual (be it a human or nonhuman) or a group of
individual humans is not an essential subject or object compelled to adapt to external
forces but that individuals emerge from and with practice” (p. 45). According to
Pickering (as cited in Boyle, 2018), “practice must be unmoored from humanist notions
of “desires, interests, rules, knowledge, social structure,” as those are decidedly based in
subject and object distinctions while actually unfolding in an otherwise “mangled”
assemblage” (p. 45). Social theories, according to Pickering, suggest we should develop
theory that “recognizes the contours of material and human agency reciprocally
constitute one another” (p. 46). Posthumanism, Boyle emphasizes, supports this and the
rejection of “knower and the known,’ so entrenched in the ways that we as humans have
come to understand our position as knowers of that which we can see and ascribe
through language. It is at the heart of what we have called an education and limits our
capacities for understanding and acknowledging the uncertain and unknown, which
really is all we truly know. In what Boyle (2018) refers to as “current-critical rhetoric…a
rhetor’s effectivity relies on one’s agency, an ability to consciously situate oneself in and
negotiate one’s actions among a variety of relationships” (p. 49). A current-critical
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rhetoric continues to focus the spotlight on humans as central to agency and how they
navigate relationships with different bodies, human and nonhuman.
As the teaching of rhetoric is currently administered, it relies a great deal on
reflective writing (Boyle, 2018). This practice of reflection on what the writer/rhetor
already knows, merely reinforcing the humanist disposition toward knowledge and the
drive for epistemological stability. Additionally, this reaffirms the human position of
presiding over all forms of knowledge, material, and bodies, rather than moving beyond
our (human) selves to locate greater capacity to affect and be affected, instinctually
expanding the human outward as opposed to drawing further inward, continuing to
reinforce the exceptionalist stance of humans and therefore tending to ignore that which
we perceive does not contribute to maintaining that position. Scholars and instructors of
rhetoric have an ethical obligation to find ways to appropriately dismantle students’
views of writing as a reflective or otherwise structured in response to what is already
known activity and guide them toward one that envisions writing (and rhetoric) as
inherently intertwined, interconnected, and necessarily kairotic, contextual, and
happening because, around, and in spite of the material, bodily, and simultaneous
occurrences and consequent interactions.
Ecology and Agency
In chapter 3, I write about capacity as it relates to affect and the rhetorical
potential residing within the capacity of all bodies, human and nonhuman. Boyle (2018)
suggests that a focus on capacity, rather than human agency, would enable a shift
toward posthumanism as it is being theorized in the teaching of rhetoric and writing. To
enhance my own argument about the relationship between rhetoric and affect, Stormer
and McGreavy (as cited by Boyle, 2018) assert that “by shifting the focus from agency to
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capacity, we revise the commonplace for discussing qualities that empower rhetoricity,
emphasizing the ecology of entanglements between entities over the abilities that are
inherent to humans” (p. 50). For the purposes of teaching rhetoric and writing, we can
consider how focusing on the entanglement of materials, bodies, events, rhetoricity, and
affect is productive in expanding the capacity for writing more deeply and with greater
intention. Drawing on work in distributed cognition, Boyle (2018) discusses the current
critical rhetoric as marked by a focus on reflection and feedback and argues that “we are
in need of an account for how practice unfolds that is not bound to or reducible to being
consciously perceived” (p. 51). In posthuman thought, while all bodies, materials, and
events are flatly tethered (Zebrowski, 2016), dependent on the invisible interactions
always taking place. Whether they are visible or not, they matter to how we think about
who we are, our (dis)position among all other forms of matter, and how we are to
responsibly, ethically navigate a world in which we are no longer thought of as a
supreme knower and master of all things.
In this vein and to echo Boyle’s supposition that rhetoric is a function of practice
which is “irreducible to an individual’s conscious agency,” posthuman rhetorical practice
inevitably expands the reach of and effectively limiting the human position in the
conceptualization and practice of rhetoric. Additionally, this concept of rhetoric is
focused on “relations a body composes” and refuses divisions between the knower and
the known, the/a body and its environment, and supports what Latour calls “an
interface that becomes more and more describable as it learns to be affected by more
and more elements” (as cited in Boyle, 2018, p. 52). In thinking more deeply about
writing and writing instruction, and as I will discuss later in this chapter, these ideas
support progressive writing instruction: labor-based grading and assessment, digital,
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physical, and material compositions that accompany writing, as we consider students
not as bound to do the work, assignments, and writing we set forth and judge by
invisible, naturalized standards of white language supremacy which produces a general
anxiety about what is expected and what can be anticipated, but as bodies with an
invisible, metaphysical connectedness (Inoue, 2019). As bodies that are wholly
informed by that which exists beyond the body, beyond the language that we use to
identify what we know, in addition to a restructured version of what matters and what
counts in writing, we as scholars and instructors can better utilize the writing classroom
to both provide transparency to students about the historical and ongoing
institutionalization of education and the whiteness that blankets writing instruction
practices.
Ethical Implications for Rhetoric and Writing Instruction
To understand rhetoric and writing as a practice that enables us to “exercise our
tendencies” and affords humans “greater capacities to affect and be affected” (Boyle,
2018), it is helpful to think how current writing classroom practices are prohibitive for
students in acquiring a wide variety of capacities through the practice of writing. When
we instruct students to respond to the prompt on the page, require them to reflect on an
event or topic in their writing, and respond to another student’s writing…then
repeat…we are reinforcing writing as a limited activity that is enclosed and restricted;
consequently, rhetoric is restrained and confined to those prescribed events reinforcing
the invisible standards of the educational status quo informed by white language
supremacy, only permitting that which is administered through the authority of the
power construct.
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Even as I write, I am trying to attend to immediate thoughts and connections I
am making without consciously considering them because I believe them to be relevant
to the task right now—it matters what I am thinking, events of the day, the way the
junipers shake in the breeze outside my window. Not because I am so important, but as
a human, I am serving as a body/vessel for the writing that is informed by that which
lies beyond my body—a body whose capacity is filled by all that which my writing is
influenced informed. My writing of this dissertation has been punctuated by the events
surrounding a pandemic, protests for racial and social justice sparked by historical and
continued police brutality, and a general sense, an undercurrent of distrust, conspiracy,
and a vast gulf separating American realities, inadvertently affecting how and what I
write, what I attend to in my writing and what capacity I have to invest and to what
extent I make use of my capacity and practices to produce writing. In a serendipitous
turn at the time I began to reach the end of this project, Marilyn Cooper’s The Animal
Who Writes (2019) acutely exemplifies the writing that embodies, as much as possible,
an “enchanted” acknowledgement of writing and thinking as a collaborative, affectual
activity that is located across the vast material, immaterial, nonhuman, ecological
“posthuman image of the world…[which] includes humans but decenters them in
relational models of assemblage and expression” (p. 4). Cooper’s book models the
thinking and disposition toward writing that teachers of writing and rhetoric are
ethically obligated to bring to the classroom in order to reinforce that “writers are not
just disembodied brains working with symbols,” but participants in an entanglement
defined by perpetual interactions that “co-emerge contingently in an ongoing process of
becoming” (Cooper, 2019, p. 9). Her writing is defined by a constant, overlapping
conversation between scholars and a drawing upon various academic arguments and
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personal observations, philosophical and pragmatic all at once, effectively materializing
her theoretical disposition toward writing as “affective entanglement” (p. 37). What
Cooper (2019) theorizes as “enchantment ontology” gives credence to the disciplinary
shift toward thinking of writing as ontological—a way of being, a way of thinking about
writing that includes fundamental assumptions that writing is intra-active (Barad,
2003) and informed by a constant state of becoming and “being-in-the-world”
(Heidegger).
Posthuman Writing Instruction
In revisiting my purpose in revealing and attending to the work of writing as an
ontological practice rather than an epistemic exercise, Cooper (2019) addresses a similar
question: why does writing matter? (p. 29). Writing matters because it is a material
expression of interactions between humans, nonhumans, and everything in between
“that precede and create the possibility of the construction of new meanings,” echoing
Kennedy (1992) Hawhee (2016), Davis (2011), and others who suggest that rhetoric is
energy and occurs primordially—that it is imbued with the vitality necessary to make
rhetorical interactions possible. Cooper (2019) suggests that writing “constitutes not
just the reality of human experience but creates material entities or phenomena that are
added to the entangled cosmos, entities that make a meaningful difference” (p.30).
Writing is therefore made possible by a responsive, observational attentiveness allowing
an unfolding of interactions between, among, and in spite of humans and nonhumans
and can be qualified as posthuman writing instruction. If we think of writing as being a
practice in which interactions of all types are matters of becoming and unfolding, then
our pedagogical response to that thinking should be one grounded in an ethical
responsibility of meeting students where they are, being truly attuned to their needs
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through rhetorical listening (Ratcliffe, 1999), and focused solely on what Cooper (2019)
suggests as “good writing habits,” defined by “serial practices that innovate responses—
written and otherwise—in the specific ecologies in which beings are entangled” (p. 38).
It is an acknowledgement of the meaningfulness of material and immaterial
convergences that produce the exigencies and kairos necessary for writing and are
therefore important to teach in the writing classroom.
Rhetoric’s Materiality
In further approaching the ethical and pedagogical implications for rethinking
rhetoric and writing, recent scholarship in rhetoric and writing studies makes clear the
relevance of rhetoric’s materiality and the affective nature of writing practices. Edbauer
(2005) suggests that “affect is the experience generated by relations—by your body-inrelation…when we encounter writing, it not only isgnifies something to us, but it also
combines with us in a degree of affectivity. Writing…involves a mutuality between
sensual and signifying effects” (as cited in Boyle, 2018, p. 53). Writing as a practice in
being, an onto-epistemological shift away from merely rearticulating through writing
the familiar subject/object, knower/known dichotomy, is necessary if we hope to fully
reimagine writing instruction as posthuman. Unfortunately, the composition classroom
has historically been a site for the production of reflective writing, which fails to
acknowledge knowing as embodied and distributed (Boyle, 2018). Reflective writing as
an academic practice is rooted in responses to a “known”—that is, something one simply
assumes as knowledge. What can be known is often not visible or obvious, and in the
case of reflective writing, there remains a void in which what we take as knowledge at
face value is of no consequence in what actually matters to who we are in connection
with what Rule (2018) calls our material co-producers. While reflective writing is indeed
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a form of knowing, it is knowing to the extent that what is apparent through books,
media, and digital objects or that which is immediately evident or can be read through
text, broadly conceived. Boyle (2016) also suggests that when writing is viewed as a
practice without the intention of meeting a particular end, then can be seen as a way to
help students engage in the world through heightening their awareness of their
relationships and dependence on materials as constituting who we are as networked
writing participants. Rather than reinforcing our separation and superiority from
“things, places, people, and all sorts of others,” Boyle (2016) recommends a model of
writing instruction he calls posthuman practice which can be conceptualized as “critical
reflection ... [in] an ongoing series of mediated encounters...[or] serial practice as a
reinvention of rhetoric’s habit of reflective, critical awareness that unfolds through
repeated material perceptions” in “an age of constant connections to digital media and
networks” (p. 534).
Decentering Reflective Writing
In his book, Boyle (2018) reinforces the “decentering” of reflective writing activity
in order to “account for how practice unfolds that is not bound to or reducible to being
consciously perceived” (p. 51). In a posthuman leveling/grounding of and with the
process of reflection in writing as a central activity in all types of writing, writing
becomes something other than a human activity that merely provides a feedback loop
that simply reinforces what we already know or can know. This feedback loop is
narrowly focused in terms of what it has the potential to reveal i.e. treating the internet
as a crystal ball—what you seek, you will surely find. Many individuals who identify with
far-right extremism in the United States, for example, have become radicalized through
this process, this practice, of a feedback loop in searching for answers they know exist
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because others have them and are willing to deliver output to serve as others’ input. The
unconscionable mass shooting that took place in my city, El Paso, Texas, at a Wal Mart
on August 3, 2019 is a painful reminder of the dangers of this kind of feedback loop
wherein the shooter’s anti-immigrant manifesto and ideology was directly informed by
8chan, an anonymous message board where users were able to post far-right extremist
content and encourage mass shooters as well as the rhetoric of President Trump. The
ethical implications for educating students in rhetoric and writing instructions are
intense. Instructors and scholars have a responsibility to impress on students the nature
of rhetoric and writing in its purely linguistic and, often and most relevantly, digital
form: we are conditioned to privilege that which appeals to our collective ego and
reinforces of our superior standing among all forms of matter through recycling what we
have already written or said to confirm our beliefs and ways of knowing that do not
consider that language is simply not all that matters in interactions and events.
Composing through Affective Rhetoricity
In an intentional move to account for the materiality we inevitably write and
compose in, Rule (2018) reiterates Boyle’s (2016) claim that writing is a networked
activity and practice that must account for our rhetorical ecology (Edbauer, 2005). In
closely examining writing’s materiality and describing the discipline’s recent “amassing
focus on materiality and objects,” Rule (2018) reasserts a flat ontography of material
bodies with “equal rhetoricity” (Zabrowski, 2016) which “reposition(s) the rhetor as but
one force in a complex material web of interactions among immediate and distant
human and nonhuman agents” is relevant to the material conditions in/by which
writing occurs (p. 406). The human as primary subject is therefore displaced as the
“isolated and autonomous rhetor,” and rhetoric is redefined and reconsidered (once
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more) as a “wider, distributed view of what and who coproduces rhetorical action”
(Rule, 2018, p. 406). Like Rickert (2013) and Edbauer (2008), Rule (2018) suggests that
this ecological accounting of co-producers in any writing environment attends to the
affective nature of rhetoric—again, calling upon the concept of affective rhetoricity.
Accounting for the affective rhetoricity of material writing relationships is relevant to
what is written. Composing, in this case, is a material process by which the writer
acknowledges the writing space, materials, and rituals that necessarily influence the
writing process. Rule’s (2018) suggestions resonate with my research interests, not in
how writers write or the processes they follow, but what they are attending to and
writing about—giving way for understanding how the materiality of our space informs
what and how we write; however, I now question that how and what writers write may
be inseparable and it is within these invisible entanglements of writing’s materiality that
I am most curious. Rule (2018) advocates a refocusing on the “micro-view of writing”
and by “temporarily halt[ing] the urge to see the big picture of writing’s situatedness in
its larger, infinite contexts, we could uncover the small, embodied and material actions
also participatory in the production and practice of writing” (p. 410).
While Rule (2018) develops a more ecological accounting of the influences of writers’
material environments, including the tools with which writers compose, Shipka (2016)
focuses on the ecological, distributed student processes of composing in the composition
classroom and describes how “concretely engaging with different modes, genres,
materials, cultural practices, communicative technologies, and language varieties”
influences “knowing and being” (p. 251). Shipka (2016) makes a call “to move toward
and facilitate a greater sense of communicational or compositional fluency ... to occasion
changes in both disposition and practice,” further developing the current disciplinary
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turn toward writing and the teaching of writing as an ontological practice (p. 252). By
engaging in “highly distributed” transmodal and translingual opportunities, students
gain a greater sense of the compositional possibilities that exist, which reveals the
“dynamic ...

embodied aspect(s) of all

communicative

practice” (Shipka, 2016, p.

252). Through

material interactions, students

learn that

“composing processes are

seldom linear”

(WPA OS 3.0, 2014) which

results in a

Figure 4: Student redrawing a photo displayed on laptop

dispositional shift toward multiple ways of composing that are anything but static and
stable. She contends that it is crucial for students to experience the processes of making
through “older, and perhaps more familiar, varieties of language ... tools, techniques,
and environments,” as it is common to assume that students should simply become
more acquainted with the latest digital technologies and in favor of abandoning nondigital technologies (Shipka, 2016, p. 253). It is by engaging/composing with the
unfamiliarity of the seemingly familiar that reveal the relevance of “the curious ability of
inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle” (Bennett,
2010, p. 6). By opening composition to include a wide range of “production practices,”
even as they themselves are material co-producers, as Rule (2018) suggests, students
can engage in “more robust concepts of materiality and nonhuman involvement and
agency” (Shipka, 2016, p. 254). Furthermore, by tracing these relationships, students
can begin to develop the acuity for understanding the agential complexities of both
humans and objects, thereby better preparing them for working and living in a world
that can only be considered fluid and unfixed. Shipka (2016) ultimately suggests that
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instead of simply adopting an ontological disposition toward the material significance of
composition and the highly distributed nature of all material in the world we inhabit, we
practice intentional integration of the material into the composition classroom, thereby
embodying and enacting the disposition we wish to project, transmit, and teach. In a
recent classroom writing activity with seniors in my English College Prep course, I
guided students in writing literacy narratives. After completing their final drafts,
students prepared a visual rendering of their written compositions, entirely selfdirected. One student photographed the outside of his home where, on the front porch,
his grandfather would read to him, illustrating vital moments in his literacy
development. The student then used a pencil to recreate the image on paper. This
activity reveals one way that posthuman writing instruction could take place in the
classroom. Posthuman writing instruction should focus on student-led inquiry informed
by critical observations, how objects and nonhuman materials are part of how we come
to know and write, and accounting for what can and cannot be seen or that which has
been made invisible through lack of human acknowledgement. Therefore, a
conscientious, radical revisioning of both traditional and seemingly more “modern”
approaches to first-year composition must occur in order to meet the complex, tangled
moment of the posthuman and our storied relationship with writing in order to make
writing matter more than how traditional notions of rhetoric have historically shaped
writing instruction. Instructors of first-year composition must work within institutional
curricular constraints to provide students with opportunities to engage more deeply
with the familiar, with objects, events, and materials—human and nonhuman—to
inform their writing. Careful, conscientious observations combined with a kind of
metaphorical listening to familiar objects and materials as deeply informative of their
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writing will engage students more soundly to the practice(s) and meaning(s) of writing.
Ethical responsibility for instructors lies in directing student attention away from
curricular practices that are focused only on a rearticulation of language and rhetorical
analysis and toward practices that capture the material, digital, affectual
entanglement(s) in which each person’s writing occurs.
In this chapter, I have examined the ethical and pedagogical implications for
affective rhetoricity in rhetoric and writing instruction. In my final chapter, I
acknowledge my own material and ephemeral entanglements with the ontological
thinking and pedagogical disposition I advocate throughout this project.
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Chapter 5: A Swarm of Entanglements
In my mother’s kitchen is a framed honey jar label from my great grandfather’s
honeybee business in Uvalde, Texas—the honey capital of the world—at the turn of the
last century. The label profoundly conjures up
my sense of the material relevance of some of
the relationalities that have literally made my
own life possible and, in consciously bringing
the past into the present, I am reminded how
Figure 5: Honey label, early 1900s
the entanglement of my personal and professional observations hav influenced my
writing and the angle at which I’m entering the disciplinary, theoretical, ontological
conversations concerning the human and the ethics of writing as one.
In this space, I cannot help but think of how the production of honey and the
rhetorical, material interaction that had to occur, to collide, making my family’s
endeavors possible, from earning a living to paying—in honey—for my grandmother’s
oldest sister to attend Drone’s Business College in the late 1920s. In my search for that
which has made me, me, and for the purposes of thinking more deeply and broadly
about how I must think about rhetoric and writing and in order to teach others more
effectively, I must necessarily acknowledge the relationships that have brought me to
this writing—through which beginnings have revealed themselves as especially
important to me. Acknowledging what matters is ethical writing practice and is vital to
making writing matter for all writers—scholars and students and everybody in between.
The work I am presently engaged in with high school students is an ethical
responsibility endowed to me in ensuring a kind of writing instruction that resists the
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dangerous temptation to default automatically toward a disposition guided first by a
model of deficiency that has a direct impact on how writing instruction is conducted. We
return, continuously, to a deficit-model—propagated by methods of current-traditional
rhetoric—of writing instruction when we fail to account for or cannot explain difference.
This reinforces our collective default toward human exceptionalism; this hypervigilance
for difference perpetuates this default tendency. If we cannot find or locate difference,
then who are we? If we do not do things that distinguish us as humans, then who are
we? In the final pages of the dissertation, I am left with more questions than when I
began.
Rhetorical Intra-dependence
Our existence is interdependent on others, human and nonhuman, and Cooper
(2019) reminds us that we “think with our bodies—and not just with our brains—and
everything we make, from texts to technologies, are material entities entangled in one
reality…” (p. 47). As human participants in the “creation of material meanings” through
writing and “we are held accountable for that participation” (p. 49). Our position, even if
we attempt to flatten it through what I have described here regarding the posthuman
and theoretical explorations into what I have called affective rhetoricity, beckons us to
understand the potential that lies in various decisions and choice that we make, that we
must become ultra-conscientious in order to become beyond that which we have
historically asserted. We have assumed that we are merely bodies with extraordinary
capacities and, we are however, in our entangled interactions, we must learn to ethically
exercise our responsibility in how we use what we know about how to be in the world
and teach others to develop a greater empathy for those bodies we interact with, visibly
or invisibly. It is not enough to be who we’ve been and, consequently, it is unacceptable
92

to operate from a position of human exceptionalism, particularly in the discipline and
teaching of rhetoric and writing studies.
Partners in Feeling
Hawhee (2016) suggests that we are not and never have been exceptional, as
ancient Greek texts summon the affectual nature of animals as “partners in feeling”—
effectively negating our superior standing over all forms of matter, human and
nonhuman. She explores the ancient and ongoing contributions of nonhuman animals
in rhetorical production, joining other rhetoric and writing scholars who have taken up
the convergences between language as material and rhetoric as energy. Language
continues to assume a central position in our traditional understanding of rhetoric,
evidenced by its prolific use in current digital and social media in which we can
instantaneously hang on every word written, inevitably reinforcing the presupposed,
superior standing of humans in rhetorical production. During a time when a pandemic
has upended human life all over the world, it is perhaps easier to see how nonhuman
materials, bodies, events, and that which we cannot immediately see are integral, vitally
material in human rhetorical activity and practice. As the field of rhetoric and writing
studies turns more convincingly toward theories of the posthuman and new materialism
to expand the scope and reach of rhetoric, animal studies has become a productive site
for better understanding how we might make the leap from the rhetorical, providential
contributions of nonhuman animals to less animate materials and bodies i.e. bacteria,
particles, and other often invisible material interactions.
As a springboard for much of current scholarship that brings together theories of
the posthuman, affect, and rhetoric, Kennedy (1992) contends that a “rhetorical energy”
is deeply rooted in all human and nonhuman bodies, providing the impetus for all
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communication and persuasion. This reconfiguration of rhetoric is beneficial to consider
as the field makes an inevitable turn toward an understanding about how matter and
bodies by drawing on scholarship from beyond the disciplinary confines, both human
and nonhuman, come to matter (Barad, 2003), the vibrancy of matter (Bennett, 2010),
the rhetorical influence of our “ambient” surroundings (Rickert, 2013), and the agency
and transformation of objects within rhetorical situations (Gries, 2016)—away from a
historically humanist account of rhetoric. Hawhee (2016) acknowledges the ancient view
toward rhetoric as the practice of oratory and the art of persuasion through fables and
memorization; however, she introduces a purview of a rationality informed by the
affectual energy nonhuman animals contribute to human rhetorical situations and
interactions. Hawhee (2016) brings vital attention to the role of nonhuman animals and
other bodies, events, and convergences, effectively displacing the human as the locus of
rhetorical control and, thereby, diminishing the historically exceptional role of human
language and communication as the primary producers of rhetoric and, consequently,
knowledge. She suggests early on in her work that in “moving past the representational
role of animals,” we can begin to accept their always already existing role as “partners in
feeling”—producing rhetoric beyond the clever uses of human language. Hawhee (2016)
ushers the past into the present, combing carefully through premodern rhetorical texts,
studying humans as animals with logos, illuminating the ancient inclusion of nonhuman
animals as vital rhetorical contributors, prompting us to reconsider rhetoric as
primordially and materially imbued by the energy that is constitutive of all bodies,
human and nonhuman. It is this meeting between the past and the present and the
acknowledgement that the beginnings of things weightily matters that I have taken up in
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my theoretical and disciplinary research. After all, I did begin this project thinking about
waves and particles.
Confronting the Human Self
In approaching the end of this dissertation which, while appearing structurally
linear for the purposes of a genre that requires a certain level of order, has been
complicated and winding in the way it was composed over the last three years: through
bits of time during days when my teaching load was lighter, my own children were either
playing or otherwise engaged and not in need of me or mothering, moments my own
mind was temporarily freed and I trusted myself enough to write, unencumbered by my
disabling perfectionism that prevents me from working, I think, until the universe
permits it or at least until all the stars line up, weaving my writing in between my
human social responsibilities and changes in the environment, even and especially
temporally, as I write the initial ideas for this chapter on the note app on my iPhone the
morning after I arrived with my three daughters to my mother’s house for Memorial Day
weekend in an effort to capitalize on every free summer moment in one made short by a
move by the school district to year round schooling to combat effects of academic
outcomes because of the pandemic. On a whim and while taking a hot bath—my mother
and sister to ensure my bath was uninterrupted—I found the space to dig back into
Cooper’s The Animal Who Writes. As I write in chapter 4, the reunion with the text was
fateful, creating a sense of relief that how I have been thinking of writing and rhetoric is
shared by many scholars, past and present.
The texts I have interacted with for this dissertation, the experiences of others I
have chosen to focus on, and the method(s) I have implemented to write have given me
fundamental starting place for doing the work of teaching rhetoric and writing. It has
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been important for me to go to the beginning (or to the beginning within the constraints
of writing which are ever-present—in fact, the act and production of writing is defined
by human social constraints) While I have thoroughly enjoyed the theoretical
immersion the dissertation has afforded me—reading, thinking, and writing about the
theories I’ve surrounded myself with throughout the years long process of writing—this
dissertation, as a teacher and scholar operating in and through various human centric
systems and institutions, I must produce concrete work: calendars and syllabi, engaging
writing activities aligned with standards set up by the university for high school
students, and making the writing classroom academically and materially meaningful.
In effect, this project has been defined by a reckoning, a confrontation of myself
as a human: my potential, my limits, my boundaries, and my boundlessness. I have had
to confront the conflicting ideas that while I write in alphabetic text, I am human and
that I must simultaneously consider my human body and its capacities as
interconnected and between, among, because of, or despite any other bodies of matter,
events, interactions, or objects. The dichotomy I have elected to wrestle with for this
dissertation and the fundamental position I have taken up as a scholar in the discipline
is one that I believe will serve as the foundation from which I build on my future
scholarship and methodologies in research and pedagogy. It has offered me a starting
place, which I have so stealthily sought in this process; however, this starting place is,
admittedly, incomplete—a snapshot of research, thought, and writing that causes me to
realize as I complete this process that this is the work I want to do. My scholarly position
requires me to vacillate between theory and practice, and in this case, I must also
contend with and confront the discomfort I feel when I must participate in the social
construct of institutions, production, human achievement when I know, deeply, that so
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much more is at stake, that so much more matters to how humans experience life as
they’ve devised it. It is my hope, this intense interest in affect and rhetoric and what
these convergences mean for writing and writing pedagogy, will define my scholarly
position as one that is always in process, unfinished, sitting with that which is and
waiting for what could be. In observing my habits of mind while writing, and in clear
relation to my process and that of the primary thrusts of this dissertation, I thought a
great deal about what I was going to write, how I was going to write it, when I was going
to do the work of writing—mentally arranging, composing, sorting. This could be a
function of not sitting down to write as often as I had planned or would have liked. I
often ignored my plans for writing this dissertation: I was supposed to write a little
every day, make a schedule, stick to it. Amid the hectic nature of life, combined with the
disruptions caused by the pandemic, I resorted to thinking instead of writing and,
therefore, I ended up writing in fits and starts—hours at a time and then not again for
weeks at times. Combined with the anxiety I feel about writing, this method was often
counter-productive and resulted in greater questioning as to my capacity for this
project, the work, the degree. Recognizing the perfectionism and anxiety about what and
how to write is evidence of a human ego; simultaneously, it is evidence that I care deeply
about whether meaning is made through the words and language I employ and are often
excruciating to write. This is clear evidence of the posthuman paradox at work. At times,
it’s almost as though I felt defeated by language and writing, the premier human
construct—one that we cling to as evidence of our superiority and dominion over all
other bodies, human and nonhuman. In my mind, if I were able to confront the words I
wanted to use, I was able to conquer them and not feel “human” again, reinforcing my
standing as knowing because of language and the ability to use it.
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Upholding the Paradox
Moving from student to early-career scholar, I have begun to think even more
broadly about the social strands I may be able to pick up for the purposes of teaching
through my theoretical scholarship. As I completed another draft of a book chapter for
an edited collection entitled Pivotal Strategies: Claiming Writing Studies as a
Discipline by Lynn Lewis, I found myself wrestling, once more with the decision to take
up theories of affect and rhetoricity in my writing, straight up against widely accepted
disciplinary knowledge of the very real implications of the spectrum of the human body
through the constructs of race and gender. As I discuss in chapter 1, I realized prior to
beginning this project, that I would need to contend with the rubs between objectedoriented ontology, material feminism, critical race theory, and indigenous knowing. My
interest in the agency of bodies, both human and nonhuman, has allowed me to think
much more broadly and deeply about agential value—the agency we assign or do not
assign a body or the capacity. When it comes to assigning agency to a human body,
however, object-oriented ontology calls on scholars to consider an extreme materiality
that privileges all bodies, materials, interactions, and events as existing with equal
rhetoricity. In support of such an ontology, each body, material, interaction, and event,
theoretically, equitably distributes power among the infinite capacities and potentialities
that exist, that may or may not occur and, therefore, it has the potential to flatten or
diminish the social constructs of race and gender so that we could view these aspects of
the human body less centrally and focus instead on what lies beyond the body—the
collision, the convergence of language, materials, bodies, interactions, events, objects.
These bodily, material affectual tendencies, according to an object-oriented ontology, do
not privilege one body or interaction over another. The same tendencies and what an
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object-oriented ontology offers in terms of a potential balancing of power, even in the
realm of the body—race and gender—simply and unfairly removes the experiences
humans have in the bodies they must carry through life. Rose and Walton (2015)
explore the paradoxical nature of posthumanism as it interacts with and, potentially,
counteracts with social justice, offering a possible remedy for the ethical complexities we
must face as a species moving forward.
Erasure of the human experience through an ontology that seeks to minimize its
existence throughout history and, often, in direct relation to the social construction of
the human body that has either directly benefited or been disadvantaged by it, is not
only impossible, but unethical, unwarranted, and outside of the realm of human
consciousness. My scholarly work, going forward, will involve my perseverance in
understanding how rhetoric and writing can function, consciously and ethically, in a
posthuman society—simultaneously, a society marked by both a sharp and speedy turn
toward technology and an intense desire to rediscover what it means to be human
beyond the social constructions we have so carefully composed, curated, and coveted. I
continue to imagine what the world was like when humans first arrived on the scene—
when there were no grocery stores, restaurants, computers, phones, or even clothing.
This naked, posthuman version of humanity intrigues me and guides my thinking,
practice, and disposition in my scholarly and pedagogical responsibilities and pursuits.
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